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1 Introduction
The notion of a behavioral elasticity occupies a critical place in the economic analysis of
taxation. Graduate textbooks teach that the two central aspects of the public sector, optimal
progressivity of the tax-and-transfer system, as well as the optimal size of the public sector,
depend (inversely) on the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the marginal
tax rate. Indeed, until recently, the closest thing we have had to a central parameter was
the labor supply elasticity. In a static model where people value only two commodities –
leisure and a composite consumption good – the real wage in terms of the consumption good
is the only relative price at issue. This real wage is equal to the amount of goods that can be
consumed per hour of leisure foregone (or, equivalently, per hour of labor supplied). At the
margin, substitution possibilities, and therefore the excess burden of taxation, can be captured
by a compensated labor supply elasticity.
With some exceptions, the profession has settled on a value for this elasticity close to zero
for prime-age males, although for married women the responsiveness of labor force participation
appears to be significant. Overall, though, the compensated elasticity of labor appears to be
fairly small. In models with only a labor-leisure choice, this implies that the efficiency cost of
taxing labor income – to redistribute revenue to others or to provide public goods – is bound
to be low, as well.
Although evidence of a substantial compensated labor supply elasticity has been hard to
find, evidence that taxpayers respond to tax system changes more generally has decidedly not
been hard to find. For example, there is compelling evidence in the U.S. the timing of capital
gains realizations reacts strongly to changes in capital gains tax rates. There was a surge in
capital gains realizations in 1986, after the U.S. government passed the Tax Reform Act of
1986 which increased tax rates on realizations in 1987 and after (Auerbach, 1988). Dropping
the top individual rax rate to below the corporate tax rate in the same Act led to a significant
increase in business activity carried out in pass-through, non-corporate form (Auerbach and
Slemrod, 1997).
Addressing these other margins of behavioral response is crucial because under some as-
sumptions all responses to taxation are symptomatic of deadweight loss. Taxes trigger a host
of behavioral responses designed to minimize the burden on the individual. In the absence of
externalities or other market failures, and putting aside income effects, all such responses are
sources of inefficiency, whether they take the form of reduced labor supply, increased charita-
ble contributions, increased expenditures for tax professionals, or a different form of business
organization, and thus they add to the burden of taxes from society’s perspective. Because in
principle the elasticity of taxable income (which we abbreviate from now on using the stan-
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dard acronym ETI) can capture all of these responses, it holds the promise of more accurately
summarizing the marginal efficiency cost of taxation than a narrower measure of taxpayer
response such as the labor supply elasticity, and therefore is a worthy topic of investigation.
The new focus raises the possibility that the efficiency cost of taxation is significantly higher
than is implied if labor supply is the sole, or principal, margin of behavioral response. Indeed,
some of the first empirical estimates of the elasticity of taxable income implied very sizeable
responses and therefore a very high marginal efficiency cost of funds. The subsequent literature
has found somewhat smaller elasticities, and raised questions about both our ability to identify
this key parameter and about the claim that it is a sufficient statistic for doing welfare analysis.
Whether the taxable income elasticity is an accurate indicator of the revenue leakage due to
behavioral response, the ultimate indicator of efficiency cost absent classical externalities,
depends on the situation. For example, if revenue leakage in current year tax revenue is
substantially offset by revenue gain in other years or in other tax bases, it is misleading.
Secondly, if some of the response involves changes in activities with externalities, then the
elasticity is not a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework underlying the taxable income elasticity concept. Section 3 presents the key identi-
fication issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the taxable income elasticity, using the
example of the 1993 top tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues. Section
4 reviews empirical studies in light of our conceptual and empirical identification frameworks.
Section 5 concludes and discusses the most promising avenues for future research. In appendix
A we present a summary of the key U.S. legislated tax changes that have been used in the
U.S. literature and in appendix B a brief description of existing U.S. tax return data.
2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Basic Model
In the standard labor supply model, individuals maximize a utility function u(c, l) where c is
disposable income, equal to consumption in a one-period model, and l is labor supply measured
by hours of work. Earnings are given by z = wl, where w is the exogenous wage rate. The
(linearized) budget constraint is c = wl(1− τ) + E where τ is the marginal tax rate and E is
virtual income.
The taxable income elasticity literature generalizes this model by noting that hours of work
are only one component of the behavioral response to income taxation. Individuals can respond
to taxation through other margins such as intensity of work, career choices, form and timing of
compensation, tax avoidance, or tax evasion. As a result, the individual’s wage rate w might
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depend on effort and respond to tax rates, and reported taxable income might also differ from
wl as individuals might split their gross earnings between taxable cash compensation and non-
taxable compensation such as fringe benefits, or even fail to report their full taxable income
because of tax evasion.
As shown by Feldstein (1999), a simple, reduced-form way to model all those behavioral
responses is to posit that utility depends positively on disposable income (equal to consump-
tion) c and negatively on reported income z (because activities generating income are costly,
for example they may require foregoing leisure). Hence, individuals choose (c, z) to maximize
a utility function u(c, z) subject to a budget constraint of the form c = (1 − τ)z + E. Such
maximization generates an individual “reported income” supply function z(1 − τ, E) where
z depends on the net-of-tax rate 1 − τ and virtual income E generated by the tax/transfer
system.1 Each individual has a particular reported income supply function reflecting his/her
skills, taste for labor, opportunities for avoidance, etc.2
In most of what follows, we assume away income effects so that the income function z
does not depend on E and depends only on the net-of-tax rate.3 In the absence of compelling
evidence about significant income effects in the case of overall reported income, it seems reason-
able to consider the case with no income effects, which simplifies considerably the presentation
of efficiency effects. It might seem unintuitive to assume away the effect of changes in exoge-
nous income on (reported taxable) income. However, in the reported income context, E is
defined exclusively as virtual income created by the tax/transfer budget constraint and hence
is not part of taxable income z. Another difference is that the labor component of z is labor
income (wl) rather than labor hours (l); this difference requires us to address the incidence of
tax rate changes (i.e., their effect on w), which we do in briefly in Section 2.2.5.
The literature on behavioral responses to taxation has attempted to estimate the elasticity
of reported incomes with respect to the net-of-tax rate, defined as
e =
1− τ
z
∂z
∂(1− τ) , (1)
the percent change in reported income when the net-of-tax rate increases by 1%. With no
1This reported income supply function remains valid in the case of non-linear tax schedules as c = (1−τ)z+E
is the linearized budget constraint at the utility-maximizing point, just as in the basic labor supply model.
2We could have posited a more general model in which c = y − τz + E, where y is real income while z
is reported income that may differ from real income because of tax evasion and avoidance. Utility would be
u(c, y, y−z) increasing in c, decreasing in y (earnings effort), and decreasing in y−z (costs of avoiding or evading
taxes). Such a utility function would still generate a reported income supply function of the form z(1 − τ, E)
and our analysis would go through. We come back to such a more general model in Section 2.3.2.
3In general, labor supply studies estimate modest income effects (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999 for a
survey). There is much less empirical evidence on the magnitude of income effects in the reported income
literature. Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate both income and substitution effects in the case of reported
incomes, and find small and insignificant income effects.
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income effects, this elasticity is equal to both the compensated and uncompensated elasticity.
Critically and as shown in Feldstein (1999), this elasticity captures not only the hours of work
response but also all other margins of behavioral response to marginal tax rates.
As we discuss later, a number of empirical studies have found that the behavioral response
to changes in marginal tax rates is concentrated in the top of the income distribution, with
less evidence of any response for the middle and upper-middle income class (see Sections 3 and
4 below).4 In the United States, because of exemptions and tax credits, individual income tax
liabilities are very skewed: the top quintile (top percentile) tax filers remitted 86.3% (39.1%)
of all individual income taxes in 2006 (Congressional Budget Office, 2009). Therefore, it is
useful to focus on the analysis of the effects of increasing the marginal tax rate on the upper
end of the income distribution. Let us therefore assume that incomes in the top bracket, above
a given reported income threshold z¯, face a constant marginal tax rate τ .5 We denote by N
the number of taxpayers in the top bracket.
As in the conceptual framework just described, we assume that individual incomes reported
in the top bracket depend on the net-of-tax rate 1−τ , and we denote by zm(1−τ) the average
income reported by taxpayers in the top bracket, as a function of the net-of-tax rate. The
aggregate elasticity of income in the top bracket with respect to the net-of-tax rate is therefore
defined as e = [(1 − τ)/zm]∂zm/∂(1 − τ). This aggregate elasticity is equal to the average
of the individual elasticities weighted by individual income, so that individuals contribute to
the aggregate elasticity in proportion to their incomes.6 Thus, in order to estimate e, most
empirical analyses (as we will see below) weight individuals by their income.
Suppose that the government increases the top tax rate τ by a small amount dτ (with no
change in the tax schedule for incomes below z¯). This small tax reform has two effects on tax
revenue. First, there is a “mechanical” increase in tax revenue due to the fact that taxpayers
face a higher tax rate on their incomes above z¯. The total mechanical effect is
dM ≡ N [zm − z¯]dτ > 0. (2)
This mechanical effect is the projected increase in tax revenue, absent any behavioral response.
Second, the increase in the tax rate triggers a behavioral response that reduces the average
reported income in the top bracket by dz = −e · zm · dτ/(1 − τ). A change dz changes tax
4The behavioral response at the low end of the income distribution is for the most part out of the scope of the
present paper. The large literature on responses to welfare and income transfer programs targeted toward low
incomes has, however, displayed evidence of significant labor supply responses (see, e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001, for a recent analysis).
5For example, in the case of tax year 2008 federal income tax law in the United States, taxable incomes of
married couples filing jointly that are above z¯ = $357, 700 are taxed at the top marginal tax rate of τ = 0.35.
6Formally, zm = [z1 + .. + zN ]/N and hence e = [(1 − τ)/zm]∂zm/∂(1 − τ) = (1 − τ)[∂z1/∂(1 − τ) + .. +
∂zN/∂(1 − τ)]/[Nzm] = [e1 · z1 + ..+ eN · zN ]/[z1 + ..+ zN ] where ei is the elasticity of individual i.
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revenue by τdz. Hence, the aggregate change in tax revenue due to the behavioral response is
equal to
dB ≡ −N · e · zm · τ
1− τ dτ < 0. (3)
Summing the mechanical and the behavioral effect, we obtain the total change in tax revenue
due to the tax change:
dR = dM + dB = Ndτ(zm − z¯) ·
[
1− e · z
m
zm − z¯ ·
τ
1− τ
]
. (4)
Let us denote by a the ratio zm/(zm − z¯). Note that in general a ≥ 1, and that a = 1 when
a single flat tax rate applies to all incomes, so that the top bracket starts at zero, that is,
when z¯ = 0. If the top tail of the distribution is Pareto distributed,7 then the parameter a
does not vary with z¯ and is exactly equal to the Pareto parameter. As the tails of actual
income distributions are very well approximated by Pareto distributions, the coefficient a is
extremely stable in the United States for z¯ above $300,000 and equals approximately 1.6
in recent years.8 The parameter a measures the thinness of the top tail of the income the
distribution: the thicker the tail of the distribution, the larger is zm relative to z¯, and hence
the smaller is a.
Using the definition of a, we can rewrite the effect of the small reform on tax revenue dR
simply as:
dR = dM
[
1− τ
1− τ · e · a
]
. (5)
Formula (5) shows that the fraction of tax revenue lost through behavioral responses–the
second term in the square bracket expression–is a simple function increasing in the tax rate
τ , the elasticity e, and the Pareto parameter a. This expression is of primary importance to
the welfare analysis of taxation because it is exactly equal to the marginal deadweight burden
created by the increase in the tax rate, under the assumptions we have made and that we
discuss below. This can be seen as follows: Because of the envelope theorem, the behavioral
response to a small tax change dτ creates no additional welfare loss and thus the utility loss
(measured in dollar terms) created by the tax increase is exactly equal to the mechanical effect
dM .9 However, tax revenue collected is only dR = dM + dB < dM because dB < 0. Thus
7A Pareto distribution has a density function of the form f(z) = C/z1+α, where C and α are constant
parameters. The parameter α is called the Pareto parameter. In that case zm =
∫∞
z¯
zf(z)dz/
∫∞
z¯
f(z)dz =
z¯ · α/(α− 1) and hence zm/(zm − z¯) = α.
8Saez (2001) provides such an empirical analysis for 1992 and 1993 reported incomes using U.S. tax return
data. Piketty and Saez (2003) provide estimates of thresholds z¯ and average incomes zm corresponding to various
fractiles within the top decile of the U.S. income distribution from 1913 to 2006, allowing a straightforward
estimation of the parameter a for any year and income threshold.
9Formally, V (1−τ, E) = maxz u(z(1−τ)+E, z) so that dV = uc · (−zdτ +dE) = −uc · (z− z¯)dτ . Therefore,
the (money-metric) utility cost of the reform is indeed equal to the mechanical tax increase, individual by
individual.
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−dB represents the extra amount lost in utility over and above the tax revenue collected dR.
From (5) and dR = dM + dB, the marginal excess burden expressed in terms of extra taxes
collected is defined as
−dB
dR
=
e · a · τ
1− τ − e · a · τ . (6)
In other words, for each extra dollar of taxes raised, the government imposes an extra cost
equal to −dB/dR > 0 on taxpayers. We can also define the “marginal efficiency cost of funds”
(MECF) as 1 − dB/dR = (1 − τ)/(1 − τ − e · a · τ). Those formulas are valid for any tax
rate τ and income distribution as long as income effects are assumed away, even if individuals
have heterogeneous utility functions and behavioral elasticities.10 The parameters τ and a
are relatively straightforward to measure, so that the elasticity parameter e is the central
parameter necessary to calculate formulas (5) and (6).
To illustrate these formulas consider the following example. In 2006, for the top 1%
income cut-off (corresponding approximately to the top 35% federal income tax bracket in
that year), Piketty and Saez (2003) estimate that a = 1.60. For an elasticity estimate of
e = 0.5 (corresponding, as we discuss later, to the mid to upper range of the estimates from the
literature), the fraction of tax revenue lost through behavioral responses (−dB/dM), should
the top tax rate be slightly increased, would be 43.1%, slightly below half of the mechanical
(i.e., ignoring behavioral responses) projected increase in tax revenue.11 In terms of marginal
excess burden, increasing tax revenue by dR = $1 causes a utility loss (equal to the MECF) of
1/(1− .431) = $1.76 for taxpayers, and hence a marginal excess burden of −dB/dR = $0.76,
or 76% of the extra $1 tax collected.
Following the supply-side debates of the early 1980s, much attention has been focused
on the revenue-maximizing tax rate. The revenue maximizing tax rate τ∗ is such that the
bracketed expression in equation (5) is exactly zero when τ = τ∗. Rearranging this equation,
we obtain the following simple formula for the tax revenue maximizing rate τ∗ for the top
bracket:
τ∗ =
1
1 + a · e. (7)
A top tax rate above τ∗ is inefficient because decreasing the tax rate would both increase the
utility of the affected taxpayers with income above z¯ and increase government revenue, which
can in principle be used to benefit other taxpayers.12 At the tax rate τ∗, the marginal excess
10In contrast, the Harberger triangle (Harberger, 1964) approximations are only valid for small tax rates. This
expression also abstracts from any marginal compliance costs caused by raising rates, and from any marginal
administrative costs unless dR is interpreted as revenue net of administrative costs. See Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002).
11The fraction would be around 50% if we included average state income tax rates and health insurance
payroll taxes in the estimate of τ .
12Formally, this a second-best Pareto-inefficient outcome as there is a feasible government policy which can
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burden becomes infinite as raising more tax revenue becomes impossible. Using our previous
example with e = 0.5 and a = 1.6, the revenue-maximizing tax rate τ∗ would be 55.6%, not
much higher than the combined maximum federal, state, Medicare, and typical sales tax rate
in the United States of 2008.
Note that when the tax system has a single tax rate (i.e., when z¯ = 0), the tax revenue
maximizing rate becomes the well-known expression τ∗ = 1/(1 + e). As a ≥ 1, the flat-rate
revenue-maximizing rate is always larger than the revenue-maximizing rate for high incomes
only. This is because increasing just the top tax rate collects extra taxes only on the portion
of incomes above the bracket threshold z¯, but produces a behavioral response for high-income
taxpayers as large as an across-the-board increase in marginal tax rates.
Giertz (2009) applies the formulas presented in this section to tax return data from pub-
lished Statistics of Income (SOI) tables produced by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in
order to analyze the impact of the potential expiration of the Bush tax cuts. Giertz shows
that exactly where the ETI falls within the range found in the literature has significant effects
on the efficiency and revenue implications for tax policy. For example, Giertz reports that
for ETIs of 0.2, 0.5 and 1.0, behavioral responses would respectively erase 12, 31 and 62% of
the mechanical revenue gain. When offsets to payroll and state income taxes are taken into
account, these numbers increase by 28%. Likewise, estimates for the marginal cost of public
funds (MCF) and the revenue-maximizing rates are quite sensitive to this range of ETIs.
In the basic model we have considered, the ETI e is a sufficient statistic to estimate the
efficiency costs of taxation as it is not necessary to estimate the structure parameters of the
underlying individual preferences. Using such sufficient statistics for welfare and normative
analysis has been used various contexts in the field of public economics in recent years (see
Chetty, 2008b for a recent survey). However, it is important to understand the limitations
of this approach and the strong assumptions required to apply it, as we show in the next
sub-sections.
2.2 Fiscal Externalities and Income Shifting
The analysis has assumed so far that the reduction in incomes due to the tax rate increase has
no other effect on tax revenue. This is a reasonable assumption if the reduction in incomes is
due to reduced labor supply (and hence an increase in untaxed leisure time), or due to a shift
from taxable cash compensation toward untaxed fringe benefits or perquisites (more generous
produce a Pareto improvement, ignoring the possibility that the utility of some individuals enters negatively
in the utility functions of others. The optimal income taxation literature following Mirrlees (1971) shows that
formula (7) is the optimal top tax rate if the social marginal utility of consumption decreases to zero when
income is large (see Saez, 2001).
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health insurance, better offices, company cars, etc.) or tax evasion. However, in many instances
the reduction in reported incomes is due in part to a shift away from individual income toward
other forms of taxable income such as corporate income, or deferred compensation that will
be taxable to the individual at a later date (see Slemrod, 1998). For example, as discussed in
more detail later, Slemrod (1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) show convincingly that part
of the surge in top individual incomes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States,
which reduced individual income tax rates relative to corporate tax rates (see appendix A),
was due to a shift of taxable income from the corporate sector toward the individual sector.
For a tax change in a given base z, we define a fiscal externality as a change in tax revenue
that occurs in any tax base z′ other than z due to the behavioral response of private agents
to the tax change in the initial base z. The alternative tax base z′ can be a different tax base
in the same time period or the same tax base in a different time period. The notion of fiscal
externality is therefore dependent on the scope of the analysis both along the base dimension
and the time dimension. In the limit where the analysis encompasses all tax bases and all time
periods (and hence focuses on the total present discounted value of tax revenue), there can be
by definition no fiscal externalities.
To see the implication of income shifting, assume that a fraction s < 1 of the incomes that
disappear from the individual income tax base following the tax rate increase dτ are shifted
to other bases and are taxed on average at rate t(< τ). For example, if two-thirds of the
reduction in individual reported incomes is due to increased (untaxed) leisure and one-third is
due to a shift toward the corporate sector, then s = 1/3 and t would be equal to the effective
tax rate on corporate income. Therefore, a behavioral response dz generates a tax revenue
change equal to (τ − t · s)dz. As a result, the change in tax revenue due to the behavioral
response becomes:
dB = −N · e · zm · τ
1− τ dτ +N · e · z
m · t · s
1− τ dτ. (8)
Therefore, formula (5) for the effect of the small reform on total tax revenue becomes:
dR = dM + dB = dM
[
1− τ − s · t
1− τ · e · a
]
. (9)
The same envelope theorem logic applies for welfare analysis: the income that is shifted to
another tax base at the margin does not generate any direct change in welfare because the tax
filer is indifferent between reporting marginal income in the individual income tax base vs. the
alternative tax base. Therefore, as above, −dB represents the marginal deadweight burden of
the individual income tax, and the marginal excess burden expressed in terms of extra taxes
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collected can be written as
−dB
dR
=
e · a · (τ − s · t)
1− τ − e · a · (τ − s · t) . (10)
The revenue-maximizing tax rate (7) becomes:
τ∗s =
1 + s · t · a · e
1 + a · e > τ
∗. (11)
If we assume again that a = 1.6, e = .5, τ = 0.35 but that half (s = 0.5) of marginal
income disappearing from the individual base is taxed on average at t = 0.3,13 the fraction
of revenue lost due to behavioral responses drops from 43% to 25%, and the marginal excess
burden (expressed as a percentage of extra taxes raised) decreases from 76% to 32%. The
revenue-maximizing tax rate increases from 55.6% to 62.2%.
This simple theoretical analysis shows therefore that, in addition to estimating the elasticity
e, it is critical to analyze whether the source or destination of changes in reported individual
incomes is another tax base. Such an alternative tax base can be a concurrent one or in
another time period, as we discuss below. Therefore, two additional parameters, in addition
to the taxable income elasticity e, are crucial in the estimation of the tax revenue effects and
marginal deadweight burden: (1) The extent to which individual income changes in the first
tax base z shift to another form of income that is taxable, characterized by parameter s, and
(2) The tax rate t at which the income shifted is taxed. In practice, there are many possibilities
for such shifting and measuring empirically all the shifting effects is challenging, especially in
the case of shifting across time. The recent literature has addressed several channels for such
fiscal externalities.
2.2.1 Individual vs. Corporate Income Tax Base
Most countries tax corporate profits with a separate corporate income tax.14 Unincorporated
business profits (such as sole proprietorships or partnerships) are in general taxed directly
at the individual level. In the United States, closely held corporations with few shareholders
(less than 100 currently) can elect to become Subchapter S corporations and be taxed solely at
13We show below that s = 0.5 and t = 0.3 are realistic numbers to capture the shift from corporate to
individual taxable income following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
14Net-of-tax corporate profits are taxed again at the individual level when paid out as dividends to individual
shareholders. Many OECD countries alleviate such double taxation of corporate profits by providing tax credits
or preferential tax treatment for dividends. If profits are retained in the corporation, they increase the value
of the company stock and those profits may, as in the United States, be taxed as realized capital gains when
the individual owners eventually sell the stock. In general, the individual level of taxation of corporate profits
is lower than the ordinary individual tax on unincorporated businesses so that the combined tax on corporate
profits and distributed profits may be lower than the direct individual tax for individuals subject to high
marginal individual tax rates.
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the individual level. Therefore, the choice of business organization (regular corporation taxed
by the corporate income tax vs. business entity taxed solely at the individual level) might
respond to the relative tax rates on corporate vs. individual income.
For example, if the individual income tax rate increases, some businesses taxed at the
individual level may choose to incorporate where they would be subjected to the corporate
income tax instead.15 In that case, the standard taxable income elasticity might be large and
the individual income tax revenue consequences significant. However, corporate income tax
revenue will increase and partially offset the loss in revenue on the individual side. It is possible
to provide a micro-founded model capturing those effects.16 Because there are heterogeneous
fixed costs of switching business form organization, in the aggregate the shifting response
to tax rates is smooth, and marginal welfare analysis is still applicable. As a result, the
reduced form formula (9) is a sufficient statistic to derive the welfare costs of taxation in that
case. Estimating s and t empirically would require knowing the imputed corporate profits of
individual shareholders.
This issue was quite significant for analyses of TRA 86 because of the sharp decline (and
change in sign!) in the difference between the top personal and corporate tax rates, which
created an incentive to shift business income from the corporation tax base to pass-through
entities such as partnerships or Subchapter S corporations, so that the business income shows
up in the individual income tax base (see appendix A for a description of the TRA 86 changes).
This phenomenon was indeed widespread immediately after TRA 86 (documented by Slemrod,
1996, Carroll and Joulfaian, 1997, and Saez, 2004 among others).
2.2.2 Short-term vs. Long-term Responses
If individuals anticipate that a tax increase will happen soon,17 they have incentives to accel-
erate taxable income realizations before the tax change takes place.18 As a result, reported
taxable income just after the reform will be temporarily depressed. In that case, the tax in-
crease has a positive fiscal externality on the pre-reform period which ought to be taken into
account in a welfare analysis.
As we will see below, this issue of re-timing is particularly important in the case of realized
15Again, to the extent that dividends and capital gains are taxed, shareholders would not entirely escape the
individual income tax.
16Alvaredo and Saez (2008) develop such a model in the case of the Spanish wealth tax, under which stock
in closely held companies is excluded from the wealth tax for individuals who own at least 15% of the business
and are substantially involved in management.
17For example, President Clinton was elected in late 1992 on a program to raise top individual tax rates,
which was indeed implemented in 1993.
18Anticipated tax decreases would have the opposite effect.
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capital gains19 and stock-option exercises (Goolsbee 2000a). Parcell (1995), Feldstein and
Feenberg (1996), as well as Sammartino and Weiner (2007) document the large shift of taxable
income into 1992 from 1993 in response to the tax increase on high-income earners promised
by President-elect Bill Clinton, and enacted in early 1993.
Conversely, adjusting to a tax change might take time (as individuals might decide to
change their career or educational choices or businesses might change their long-term invest-
ment decisions), creating a negative fiscal externality in future years. In that case, the short-
term response elasticity would underestimate the welfare cost of taxation. Therefore, in both
cases, it is preferable to estimate the long-term response of tax changes although, as we discuss
below, the long-term response is more difficult to identify empirically. The empirical literature
has primarily focused on short-term (1 year) and medium-term (up to 5 year) responses, and
is not able to convincingly identify very long-term responses.
The labor supply literature started with a static framework and then developed a dynamic
framework to distinguish between responses to temporary changes versus permanent changes in
wage rates (MaCurdy, 1981). Although the ETI literature has not explicitly developed such a
framework, the same theoretical issues of responses to temporary versus permanent tax changes
arise. Because of inter-temporal substitution, and barring adjustment costs, responses to
temporary changes will be larger than responses to permanent changes.20 This is an important
issue to keep in mind when discussing empirical studies.
The issue of long-term responses is particularly important in the case of capital income,
as capital income is the consequence of past savings and investment decisions. For example, a
higher top income tax rate might discourage wealth accumulation or dissipate existing fortunes
faster. The new long-term wealth distribution equilibrium might not be reached for decades
or even generations, which makes it particularly difficult to estimate the long-run elasticity.
Estimating the effects on capital would require developing a dynamic model of tax responses,
which has not yet been developed in the context of the ETI literature.
2.2.3 Current vs. Deferred Income
If current income tax rates increase but long-term future expected income tax rates do not,
individuals might decide to defer some of their incomes, for example, in the form of future
19The most famous example is the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, which increased the top tax rate on realized
capital gains from 20% to 28%, and generated a surge in capital gains realizations at the end of 1986 (Auerbach,
1988; Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare, 1994).
20In the labor supply literature, responses to temporary changes are captured by the Frisch elasticity which
higher than the compensated elasticity to permanent changes.
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pension payments21 (deferred compensation) or future realized capital gains.22 In that case,
a current tax increase might have a positive fiscal externality in future years; such a fiscal
externality affects the welfare cost of taxation as we described above. A similar issue applies
whenever a change in tax rates affects business investment decisions undertaken by individuals.
If, for example, a lower tax rate induces sole proprietors or principals in pass-through entities
to expand investment, the short-term effect on taxable income may be negative, reflecting the
deductible net expenses in the early years of an investment project.
2.2.4 Tax Evasion
Suppose that a tax increase leads to a higher level of tax evasion. In that case, there might
be increases in taxes collected on evading taxpayers following audits. This increased audit-
generated tax revenue is another form of a positive fiscal externality. In practice, most em-
pirical studies are carried out using tax return data before audits take place, and therefore
do not fully capture the revenue consequences. Chetty (2008) makes this point formally and
shows that, under risk neutrality assumptions, at the margin an individual is indifferent be-
tween evading one dollar more and facing a marginally higher audit rate, and therefore the
tax revenue lost due to increased tax evasion is exactly recouped (in expectation) by increased
fines collected by the government. As a result, in that case, the elasticity that matters for
deadweight burden is not the elasticity of reported income but instead the elasticity of real
income.
2.2.5 Other Fiscal Externalities
Changes in reported incomes might also have consequences for bases other than federal income
taxes. An obvious example is the case of state income taxes in the United States. If formula
(6) is applied to the federal income tax only, it will not capture the (negative) externality on
state income tax revenue (as states use virtually the same tax base as the federal government).
In that case (ignoring the deductibility of state income taxes for federal tax purposes), we have
s = −1 and t is the state income tax rate. Put another way, our original analysis should be
based on the total federal plus state income tax rate τ + t.
Changes in reported individual income due to real changes in economic behavior (such as
reduced labor supply) can also have consequences for consumption taxes (if, for example, less
21In the United States, individual workers can electively set aside a fraction of their earnings into pension
plans (traditional IRAs and 401(k)s) or employers can provide increased retirement contributions at the expense
of current compensation. In both cases, those pension contributions are taxed when the money is withdrawn
as pension income.
22For example, companies, on behalf of their shareholders, may decide to reduce dividend payments which
are taxed now and retain earnings in order to generate capital gains that are taxed later when the stock is sold.
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labor income is accompanied by less consumption). In particular, a broad-based value added
tax is economically equivalent to an income tax (with expensing) and therefore should also be
included in the tax rate used for welfare computations.
Finally, fiscal externalities may also arise due to classical general equilibrium incidence ef-
fects. For example, a reduced tax rate on high incomes might stimulate labor supply of workers
in highly paid occupations, and hence could decrease their pre-tax wage rate while increasing
the pre-tax wage rates of lower-paid occupations through general equilibrium effects.23 Such
incidence effects are effectively transfers from some factors of production (high-skilled labor in
our example) to other factors of production (low-skilled labor). If different factors are taxed
at different rates (due for example of a progressive income tax), then those incidence effects
will have fiscal consequences. Conceptually, however, as those incidence effects are transfers,
the government can always readjust tax rates on each factor in order to undo those incidence
effects at no fiscal cost. Therefore, in a standard competitive model, incidence effects do not
matter for the efficiency analysis nor for optimal tax design.24
2.3 Other Issues
2.3.1 Classical Externalities
There are situations where individual responses to taxation may involve classical externalities.
Two prominent examples are charitable giving and mortgage interest payments for residential
housing, which in the United States and some other countries are deductible from taxable
income, a tax treatment which is often justified on the grounds of classical externalities. Con-
tributions to charitable causes create positive externalities when the contributions increase the
utility of the beneficiaries of the nonprofit organizations. To the extent that mortgage interest
deductions increase home ownership, they arguably create positive externalities in neighbor-
hoods (although the level or even the existence of such a net home ownership externality is
debated, see e.g., Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003). Expenditures on such deductible items may
rise following a tax increase because their net price is equal to the net-of-tax rate 1− τ when
deductions are itemized.25 Increased expenditures on these items will decrease taxable income.
Suppose a fraction s of the taxable income response to a tax rate increase dτ is due to
23Such effects are extremely difficult to convincingly estimate empirically. Kubik (2004) attempts such an
analysis and finds that, controlling for occupation-specific time trends in wage rates, individuals in occupations
that experienced large decreases in their median marginal tax rates due to TRA86 received lower pre-tax wages
after 1986 as the number of workers and the hours worked in these professions increased.
24Indeed, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that optimal tax formulas are the same in a model with fixed
prices of factors (with no incidence effects) and in a model with variable prices (with incidence effects).
25There is a large empirical literature finding significant responses of charitable giving to individual marginal
income tax rates. See, for example, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002), Clotfelter and Schmalbeck (1996),
Randolph (1995) and Karlan and List (2007).
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higher expenditures on activities such as charitable giving that create an externality with a
social marginal value of t dollars, per dollar of additional expenditure. In that case, formula
(9) applies by just substituting the alternative tax base rate t by the social marginal value
of the externality. For example, in the extreme case where all the taxable income response
comes from tax expenditures (s = 1) with income before tax expenditures being unresponsive
to tax rates, and if t = τ (the social marginal value of tax expenditures externalities is equal
to the income tax rate τ) then there is zero marginal excess burden from taxation. (It is a
Pigouvian tax.) 26 More generally, to the extent that the behavioral response to higher tax
rates generates positive externalities, formula (4) will overstate the marginal efficiency cost of
taxation.
Because the bulk of items that are deductible from taxable income in the United States
– state and local income taxes, mortgage interest deductions, and charitable giving – may
generate fiscal or classical externalities, the elasticity of a broader, pre-deduction, concept
of income (such as adjusted gross income in the United States) is of interest in addition
to a taxable income elasticity. That is why much conceptual and empirical analyses focus
on adjusted gross income – which is not net of such deductible items – rather than taxable
income.
Classical externalities might also arise in agency models where executives set their own
pay by expending efforts to influence the board of directors.27 It is conceivable that such
pay-setting efforts depend on the level of the top income tax rate and would increase following
a top tax rate cut. In such a case, top executive compensation increases come at the expense
of shareholders returns which produces a negative externality.28 Such an externality would
reduce the efficiency costs of taxation (as correcting the externality precisely requires a positive
tax in that case).
2.3.2 Changes in the Tax Base Definition and Tax Erosion
As pointed out by Slemrod (1995) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), how broadly the tax
base is defined affects the taxable income elasticity. For example, in general the more tax
deductions that are allowed, the higher will be the taxable income elasticity. This implies that
the final taxable income elasticity depends not only on individual preferences (as we posited
26Saez (2004b) develops a simple optimal tax model to capture those effects.
27Under perfect information and competition, executives would not be able to set their pay at a different level
from their marginal product. In reality, the marginal product of top executives cannot be perfectly observed,
which creates scope for influencing pay, as discussed extensively in Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
28Such externalities would fit into the framework developed by Chetty (2008). Following the analysis of
Chetty and Saez (2007), such agency models produce an externality only if the pay contract is not second-best
Pareto efficient, e.g., it is set by executives and large shareholders on the board without taking into account
the best interests of small shareholders outside the board.
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in our basic model in Section 2.1) but also on the tax structure. Therefore, the tax base choice
determines in part the taxable income elasticity, and hence the latter can be thought of as
a policy choice. The same logic applies to the enforcement of a given tax base, which can
particularly affect the behavioral response of avoidance schemes and evasion.
This point is paramount for policy analysis. Suppose that we estimate a large taxable
income elasticity because the tax base is set such that there are loopholes making it easy to
shelter income from tax (we discuss in detail such examples using U.S. tax reforms below). In
the narrow model of Section 2.1, the policy prescription is to have a lower tax rate. However,
in a broader context, a much better policy may be to eliminate loopholes in order to reduce
the taxable income elasticity and the deadweight burden of taxation. 29
Let us consider a simple example to illustrate this point. As in our basic model, individuals
supply effort to earn income z. Suppose individuals can, at some cost, shelter part of their
income z into another form that might receive preferable tax treatment. Let us denote w+y =
z, where y is sheltered income and w is unsheltered income. Formally, individuals maximize
a utility function of the form u(c, z, y) that is decreasing in z (earning income requires effort)
and y (sheltering income is costly). Suppose we start from a comprehensive tax base where z
is taxed at rate τ so that c = (1 − τ)z + E (E denotes a lump-sum transfer). In that case,
sheltering income is costly and provides no tax benefit so that individuals choose y = 0 and
the analysis is the same as in Section 3.1 where the relevant elasticity is the elasticity of total
income z with respect to 1− τ .
Suppose now that the tax base is eroded by excluding y from taxation. In that case
c = (1 − τ)w + y + E = (1 − τ)z + τy + E. Therefore, individuals will find it profitable
to shelter some of their income up to point where τ · uc = uy. We can define the indirect
utility v(c′, w) = maxyu(c′ + y, w + y, y) and the analysis of Section 3.1 applies using the
elasticity of taxable income w with respect to 1−τ . Because w = z−y and sheltered income y
responds (positively) to the tax rate τ , the elasticity of w is larger than the elasticity of z and
hence the deadweight burden of taxation is higher with the narrower case. Intuitively, giving
preferential treatment to y induces taxpayers to waste resources to shelter income y, which
is pure deadweight burden. As a result, starting from the eroded tax base and introducing a
small tax dt > 0 on y actually reduces the deadweight burden from taxation, showing that the
eroded tax base is a suboptimal policy choice.30
Therefore, comprehensive tax bases with low elasticities are preferable to narrow bases with
29This possibility is developed in the context of an optimal linear income tax in Slemrod (1994), which draws
on the metaphor of Okun (1975) in which revenue leakage is the leak in a bucket that transfers income from
the top of the income distribution to the bottom.
30This can be proved easily in a separable model with no income effects where u(c, z, y) = c− h1(z) − h2(y).
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large elasticities. Possible legitimate reasons for narrowing the tax base are (1) administrative
simplicity (as in the model of Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002),31 (2) redistributive concerns32
and (3) externalities such as charitable contributions, as discussed above.33
3 Empirical Estimation and Identification Issues
3.1 A Framework to Analyze the Identification Issues
In order to assess the validity of various empirical methods and the key identification issues,
it is useful to consider a very basic model of income reporting behavior. Individual i reports
income zit and faces a marginal tax rate τit = T ′(zit) in year t. We assume that reported
income zit responds to marginal tax rates with elasticity e so that zit = z0it · (1− τit)e, where
z0it is income reported when the marginal tax rate is zero, which we call potential income.
34
Therefore, using logs, we have:
log zit = e · log(1− τit) + log z0it. (12)
Note, in light of our previous theoretical discussion, the assumptions that are embedded in
this simple model: (1) No income effects (as virtual income E is excluded from specification
(12), (2) The response to tax rates is immediate and permanent (so that short-term and long-
term elasticities are identical), (3) The elasticity e is constant over time and uniform across
individuals at all levels of income,35 (4) Individuals have perfect knowledge of the tax structure
and choose zit after they know the exact realization of potential income z0it. We will come back
to these assumptions below.
Even within the context of this simple model, an OLS regression of log zit on log(1 − τit)
would not identify the elasticity e in the presence of a graduated income tax schedule because
τit is positively correlated with potential log-income log z0it; this occurs because the marginal
tax rate may increase with realized income z. Therefore, it is necessary to find instruments
correlated with τit but uncorrelated with potential log-income, log z0it, to identify the elasticity
e. The recent taxable income elasticity literature has used changes in the tax rate structure
created by tax reforms in order to obtain such instruments. Intuitively, in order to isolate the
31In many practical cases, however, a comprehensive tax base such as a VAT is actually administratively
simpler than a complex income tax with many exemptions and a narrower base.
32Excluding large out-of-pocket health expenditures, as done in the U.S. individual income tax code, could
be such an example.
33The public choice argument that narrow bases constrain Leviathan governments would fall in that category,
as a Leviathan government produces a negative externality.
34A quasi-linear utility function of the form u(c, z) = c − z0(z/z0)1+1/e/(1 + 1/e) generates such income
response functions.
35This assumption can be relaxed in most cases, but it sometimes has important consequences for identifica-
tion, as we discuss below.
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effects of the net-of-tax rate, one would want to compare observed reported incomes after the
tax rate change to the incomes that would have been reported had the tax change not taken
place. Obviously, the latter are not observed and must be estimated. We describe in this
Section the methods that have been proposed and used to overcome this identification issue.
3.2 Simple before and after Reform Comparison
The simplest method uses reported incomes before a tax reform as a proxy for reported incomes
after the reform (had the reform not taken place). This simple difference estimation method
amounts to comparing reported incomes before and after the reform and attributing the change
in reported incomes to the changes in tax rates.
Suppose that tax rates increase at time t = 1 because of a tax reform. Using repeated cross
sections spanning the pre and post-reform periods, we can run the following 2SLS regression:
log zit = e · log(1− τit) + εit, (13)
using the post-reform indicator 1(t ≥ 1) as an instrument for log(1 − τit). This regression
identifies e if εit is uncorrelated with 1(t ≥ 1). In the context of our simple model (12),
this requires that potential log-incomes are not correlated with time. This assumption is
very unlikely to hold in practice, as real economic growth creates a direct correlation between
income and time. If more than two years of data are available, one could add a linear trend
β · t in (13) to control for secular growth. However, as growth rates vary year-to-year due
to macroeconomic business cycles, the elasticity estimate will be biased if economic growth
happens to be different from year t = 0 to year t = 1 for reasons unrelated to the level of tax
rates–we will ascribe to the tax change the impact of an unrelated but coincident change in
average incomes.
In many contexts, however, tax reforms affect subgroups of the population differentially,
and in some cases they leave tax rates essentially unchanged for most of the population. For
example, in the United States during the last three decades, the largest absolute changes in
tax rates have taken place at the top of the income distribution, with much smaller changes on
average in the broad middle. In that context, one can use the group less (or not) affected by
the tax change as a control and hence proxy unobserved income changes in the affected group
(absent the tax reform) with changes in reported income in the control group. Such methods
naturally lead to consideration of difference-in-differences estimation methods discussed in
Section 3.4.
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3.3 Share analysis
When the group affected by the tax reform is relatively small, one can simply normalize
incomes of the group affected by a tax change by the average income in the population in order
to control for macro-economic growth. Indeed, the most dramatic changes in U.S. marginal
federal income tax rates have taken place at the top percentile of the income distribution (in
appendix A we discuss in more detail the key individual tax changes since 1960). Therefore,
and following Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Slemrod (1996), a natural measure of the
evolution of top incomes relative to the average is the change in the share of total income
reported by the top percentile.36 Figure 1A displays the average marginal tax rate (weighted
by income) faced by the top percentile income earners (scaled on the left y-axis) along with
the share of total personal income reported by the top percentile earners (scaled on the right
y-axis) from 1960 to 2006.37 The figure shows that indeed the marginal tax rate faced by the
top 1% have declined dramatically since 1980. It is striking to note that the share received
by the top 1% of income recipients started to increase precisely after 1981 — when marginal
tax rates started to decline. The timing of the jump in the share of top incomes from 1986
to 1988 corresponds exactly to the sharp drop in the weighted average marginal tax rate from
45% to 29% after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These correspondences in timing, first noted
by Feenberg and Poterba (1993), provide circumstantial but quite compelling evidence that
high incomes are indeed responsive to marginal tax rates.
Figure 1B shows the same income share and marginal tax rate series for the next 9% highest
income tax filers (i.e., the top decile excluding the top 1% from Panel A). The marginal tax
rate follows a different pattern, first increasing from 1960 to 1981 due primarily to bracket
creep (as the tax system in this period was not indexed for inflation), followed by a decline
until 1988 and relative stability afterwards. In contrast to the top 1%, however, the share
of the next 9% in total income is very smooth and trends slightly upward during the entire
period. Most importantly, it displays no correlation with the level of the marginal tax rate
either in the short run or in the long run. Thus, the comparison of Panel A and Panel B
suggests that the behavioral responses of the top 1% are very different from those of the rest
of top decile, and hence that the elasticity e is unlikely to be constant across income groups.
Using the series displayed in Figure 1, one can estimate the elasticity of reported income
around a tax reform episode taking place between pre-reform year t0 and post-reform year t1
36In what follows, we always exclude realized capital gains from our income measure as realized capital gains
in general receive a tax-favored treatment and there is a large literature analyzing specifically capital gains
realization behavior and taxes (see Auerbach 1988 for a survey). See a further discussion of this issue in Section
4.1.
37This figure is an update of a figure presented in Saez (2004).
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as follows:
e =
log pt1 − log pt0
log(1− τp,t1)− log(1− τp,t0)
, (14)
where pt is the share of income accruing to the top 1% (or the next 9%) earners in year t and
τp,t is the average marginal tax rate (weighted by income) faced by taxpayers in this income
group in year t. This method identifies the elasticity if, absent the tax change, the top 1%
income share would have remained constant from year t0 to year t1. As shown in Table 1,
Panel A, applying this simple method using the series depicted in Figure 1 around the 1981 tax
reform by comparing 1981 and 1984 generates an elasticity of 0.60 for the top 1%. Comparing
1986 and 1988 around the Tax Reform Act of 1986 yields a very large elasticity of 1.36 for
the top 1%.38 In contrast, column (2) in Table 1 shows that the elasticities for the next 9%
are much closer to zero around those two tax episodes. The 1993 tax reform also generates
a substantial elasticity of 0.45 for the top 1% when comparing 1992 and 1993. Strikingly,
though, comparing 1991 to 1994 yields a negative elasticity for the top 1% – probably due to
tax rate endogeneity, as there were no legislated changes between 1991 and 1992 or between
1993 and 1994. Hence, Table 1 shows that the elasticity estimates obtained in this way are
sensitive to the specific reform, the income group, as well as the choice of years – important
issues we will come back to later on.
A natural way to estimate the elasticity e using the full time-series evidence is to run a
simple time-series regression of the form:
log pt = e · log(1− τp,t) + εt. (15)
As reported in Table 1, such a regression generates a very high estimate of the elasticity e
of 1.71 for the top 1%.39 However, this is an unbiased estimate only if, absent any marginal
tax rate changes, the top 1% income share series would have remained constant or moved in
a way that is uncorrelated with the evolution of marginal tax rates. But it is entirely possible
that inequality changed over time for reasons unrelated to tax changes: the secular increase in
income concentration in the United States since the 1960s was probably not entirely driven by
changes in the top tax rates, hence biasing upward the estimate of e.4041 For example, Figure
1 shows that there was a sharp increase in the top 1% income share from 1994 to 2000 in spite
of little change in the marginal tax rate faced by the top 1%, which suggests that changes in
marginal tax rates are not the sole determinant of the evolution of top incomes (at least in
38Goolsbee (2000b) also obtained such a large elasticity using TRA 1986 and a similar approach.
39The estimated elasticity for the next 9% is very small (e = 0.01), and not significantly different from zero.
40See Katz and Autor (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of wage inequality in the United States since 1960.
41Reverse causality is also a possibility. If incomes of the already affluent increase, the group might have
more political influence and success in lobbying the government to cut top tax rates.
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the short run).42
It is possible to add controls for various factors affecting income concentration through
channels other than tax rates in regression (15), as in Slemrod (1996). Unfortunately, we
do not have a precise understanding of what those factors might be. An agnostic solution is
to add time trends to (15). As shown in Table 1, such time trends substantially reduce the
estimated elasticity, although it remains significant and above 0.5. The key problem is that we
do not know exactly what time-trend specifications are necessary to control for non-tax related
changes, and adding too many time controls necessarily destroys the time-series identification.
It could be fruitful to extend this framework to a multi-country time-series analysis. In
that case, general time trends will not destroy identification, although it is possible that
inequality changes differentially across countries (for non-tax related reasons), in which case
country-specific time trends would be required and a similar identification problem would
arise. Atkinson and Leigh (2004) and Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom (2008) propose first
steps in that direction. The macro-economic literature has recently used cross-country time-
series analysis to analyze the effects of tax rates on aggregate labor supply (see e.g., Ohanian,
Raffo, and Rogerson, 2008) but has not examined directly effects on reported income, let alone
reported income by income groups.
3.4 Differences-in-difference Methods
Most of the recent literature has used micro-based regressions using “differences-in-difference”
(DD) methods43 in which changes in reported income of a treatment group (experiencing a tax
change) are compared to changes for a “control” group (which does not experience the same,
or any, tax change).44 It is useful to point out from the start that the concept of treatment
and control groups in the ETI context is substantially different from the ideal randomized
experiment where a randomly selected treatment group would be assigned to a specific tax
rate. Indeed, in the ETI context, control and treatment groups are almost always defined by
income which creates several identification issues.
In order to illustrate the identification issues that arise with those various methods, we
will examine the 1993 tax reform in the United States that introduced two new income tax
brackets — raising rates for those at the upper-end of the top tax bracket from 31% (in 1992
and before) to 36% or 39.6% (in 1993 and after) and enacted only minor other changes (see
42Slemrod and Bakija (2001) call the behavior of reported taxable income over this period a “non-event
study.”
43For earlier reviews of this literature, see Slemrod (1998) and Giertz (2004).
44Note that share analysis is conceptually related to the DD method as share analysis compares the evolution
of incomes is a given quantile (the numerator of the share is the treatment group) relative to the full population
(the denominator of the share is implicitly the control group).
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appendix A for details). Figure 1 shows that the average marginal tax rate for the top 1%
increased sharply from 1992 to 1993 but that the marginal tax rate for the next 9% was not
affected. Our empirical analysis is based on the Treasury panel of tax returns described in
Giertz (2008c). As we discuss in appendix B, those panel data are created by linking the large
annual tax return data stratified by income used by U.S. government agencies. Therefore, the
data include a very large number of top 1% taxpayers.
3.4.1 Repeated Cross-Section Analysis
Let us denote by T the group affected by the tax change (the top 1% in our example) and
by C a group not affected by the reform (the next 9% in our example). We denote by t0 the
pre-reform year and by t1 the post-reform year. Generalizing our initial specification (13), we
can estimate the 2SLS regression:
log zit = e · log(1− τit) + α · 1(t = t1) + β · 1(i ∈ T ) + εit, (16)
on a repeated cross-section sample including both the treatment and control groups and includ-
ing the year t0 and year t1 samples, and using as an instrument for log(1− τit) the post-reform
and treatment group interaction 1(t = t1) · 1(i ∈ T ).
Although we refer in this section to income tax rate schedule changes as a treatment, they
certainly do not represent a classical treatment in which a random selection of taxpayers is pre-
sented with a changed tax rate schedule, while a control group of taxpayers is not so subject.
In fact, in any given year all taxpayers of the same filing status face the same rate schedule.
When the rates applicable at certain income levels change more substantially than the rates
at other levels of income, however, some taxpayers are more likely to face large changes in the
applicable marginal tax rate than other taxpayers. Two problems arise. The first is that when
the likely magnitude of the tax rate change is correlated with income, any non-tax-related
changes in taxable income that vary systematically by income group will need to be disentan-
gled from the effect on taxable incomes of the rate changes. Second, non-tax-related changes
in income may affect which marginal tax rate is applicable to a taxpayer in a given year.
Because the presence of transitory income implies mean reversion, some of this year-to-year
change will be systematic; this will be especially problematic in periods when tax rates con-
verge, or diverge, because the mean reversion in taxable income will be correlated (negatively
or positively, respectively) with the expected effect of the tax rate changes themselves.
We run regression (16) weighted by income zit (in order to give proportionally more weight
to high-income taxpayers, as their response contributes proportionately more to the aggregate
elasticity as discussed in Section 2.1). The 2SLS estimate is a classical difference-in-difference
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estimate equal to:
e =
[E(log zit1 |T )− E(log zit0 |T )]− [E(log zit1 |C)− E(log zit0 |C)]
[E(log(1− τit1)|T )− E(log(1− τit0)|T )]− [E(log(1− τit1)|C)− E(log(1− τit0)|C)]
.
(17)
Thus, the elasticity estimate is the ratio of the pre- to post-reform change in log incomes in the
treatment group minus the same ratio for the control group to the same difference-in-differences
in log net-of-tax rates (with all expectations weighted by income).
Using data from 1992 (pre-reform) and 1993 (post-reform), we define the treatment group
as the top 1% and the control group as the next 9% (90th percentile to 99th percentile).
Note that being in the treatment group depends on the taxpayer’s behavior. Table 2, Panel
A shows that the elasticity estimate is around one, which reflects the fact that the top 1%
incomes decreased sharply from 1992 to 1993 while the next 9% incomes remained stable as
shown in Figure 1. However, comparing 1991 to 1994 generates a negative elasticity, as the
top 1% incomes increased faster than the next 9% incomes from 1991 to 1994 (Figure 1). The
sign switch mirrors the results of Table 1, Column 1.
As is standard in the case of DD estimation, formula (17) will yield an unbiased estimate of
the elasticity e if the parallel trend assumption holds: Absent the tax change, the numerator
would have been zero, i.e., log-income changes pre- to post-reform would have been the same
in the treatment and control groups. In the case of our example, that means that the top
1% incomes grow at the same rate as the next 9% incomes (absent the tax change). Such an
assumption can be tested using pre-reform years or post-reform years in order to construct
placebo differences-in-difference estimates. As is clear from Figure 1, the top 1% incomes
increase sharply from 1994 to 2000 relative to average incomes while the share of the next 9%
income is almost flat. Therefore, the DD identification assumption is clearly violated in the
post-reform period.
In cases where the parallel trend assumption does not hold, we can generalize equation (16)
by pooling together several pre-reform years and post-reform years and running the following
2SLS regression (assuming the tax change takes place in year t¯):
log zit = e · log(1− τit) + α · 1(t ≥ t¯) + β · 1(i ∈ T ) + γC · t+ γT · t · 1(i ∈ T ) + εit, (18)
where we have added separate time trends for the control and treatment groups and where
the instrument is the post-reform and treatment interaction 1(t ≥ t¯) · 1(i ∈ T ). As shown
in Table 2, Panel A, with no time trends the regression produces a negative elasticity of
e = −0.404(0.089) because the top 1% incomes increase faster than next 9% incomes over the
period 1991 to 1997 in spite of the top tax rate increase. Adding time trends generates a very
large and positive elasticity of e = 1.329(0.107). This large elasticity can be explained using
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the evidence from Figure 1: from 1991 to 1997, the top 1% incomes increase relative to the
next 9%. However, from 1992 to 1993, top 1% incomes fall overall and relative to the next 9%
incomes exactly at the time of the tax change. Hence, the pooled regression (18) assumes that
this reversal is due to a large immediate and permanent elasticity of reported income with
respect to tax rates. We discuss below the issue of short-term vs. long-term responses, which
is central to this particular tax episode. Column (2) in Table 2 shows that those repeated
cross-section estimates are not sensitive to broadening the control group from the next 9% to
the next 49% as incomes for both the next 9% and the next 49% move together, exhibiting
very slow growth over the period.
Finally, note that if the control group faces a tax change, DD estimates will consistently
estimate the elasticity only if the elasticities are the same for the two groups. To see this, refer
back to equation (17). Suppose that the control group experiences a change in tax rates that
is half the size of the tax rate change for the treatment group, so that E(log(1 − τit1)|C) −
E(log(1− τit0)|C) = 0.5 · [E(log(1− τit1)|T )−E(log(1− τit0)|T )]. Assume further that the DD
identification assumption holds, but that the elasticity in the control group is zero while the
elasticity is eT > 0 in the treatment group. In that case, we have E(log zit1 |T )−E(log zit0 |T ) =
eT · [E(log(1 − τit1)|T ) − E(log(1 − τit0)|T )] and E(log zit1 |C) − E(log zit0 |C) = 0 and hence
formula (17) leads to e = 2 · eT : the estimated elasticity is twice as large as the true elasticity
in the treatment group. This example might actually apply around TRA 1986 as we have seen
in Table 1 that, based on share elasticities, the elasticity around that episode may be large for
the top 1% but close to zero for the next 9% (and the next 9% experiences a tax rate cut that
is about half of the tax rate cut for the top 1% from 1986 to 1988). This source of bias partly
explains why Feldstein (1995) obtained such large elasticities around TRA 1986, a point made
originally by Navratil (1995b), as we discuss in Section 4.1.2.
3.4.2 Panel Analysis
Following the influential analysis of Feldstein (1995), the great majority of empirical studies
have used panel data to estimate the elasticity of reported taxable income with respect to net-
of-tax rates. With panel data, we can define the treatment group T as the top 1% of income
earners and the control group C as the next 9% of tax filers based on income in pre-reform
year t0, and follow those tax filers into post-reform year t1. We can then run the 2SLS panel
regression:
log
zit1
zit0
= e · log
(
1− τit1
1− τit0
)
+ εit, (19)
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using 1(i ∈ T ) as the instrument. This regression also estimates a difference-in-difference
parameter:
e =
E
(
log zit1zit0
|T
)
− E
(
log zit1zit0
|C
)
E
[
log
(
1−τit1
1−τit0
)
|T
]
− E
[
log
(
1−τit1
1−τit0
)
|C
] . (20)
As shown in Table 2, Panel B, such a regression generates a very large elasticity of 1.395
(0.107), as the top 1% income earners in 1992 experience a drop in reported taxable income
of about 15% in 1993 while the next 9% income earners in 1992 experience a drop of less than
5%.
As above, this elasticity estimate is unbiased if, absent the tax change, the numerator
of (20) is zero: log income changes are the same in the treatment and control group. As
we described in our discussion of repeated cross-section analyses, this assumption might be
violated if there are changes in income inequality: the top 1% incomes might have increased
faster than the next 9% earners even in the absence of a tax change. In the case of panel
analysis, however, another problem arises. Even in the absence of changes in the income
distribution, the identification assumption might not hold because of mean reversion: the top
1% incomes in base year t0 are likely to decrease because many individuals were in the top 1%
in year t0 due to large positive transitory incomes.45 The longitudinal tax data can be used to
illustrate the issue. In 1992, tax returns in the top 1% of incomes average $460,000 of income
but in 1993 those same tax filers report only $400,000 on average. In contrast, the top 1%
income earners in 1993 report $430,000. Hence, the drop in the income of those in the top 1%
in 1992 is twice as large as in the repeated cross section. This helps to explain why the panel
estimate of the elasticity of taxable income of 1.395 is larger than the repeated cross-section
estimate of 0.998. As shown in column (2), when the control group is broadened to the next
49%, the panel estimate increases further to 1.878, as mean reversion of the top 1% is larger
relative to the next 49% than relative to the next 9%.
Mean reversion in panel analysis is more pronounced when lengthening the lag between
year t0 and t1; Table 2 shows that the estimates comparing 1991 to 1994 are much larger
than the estimates comparing 1992 to 1993. Indeed, the large positive estimates of the taxable
income elasticity using panel data from 1991 and 1994 data are in stark contrast to the negative
estimates from using repeated cross-section analysis. This suggests that mean reversion bias
swamps the increase in the top 1% incomes from 1991 to 1994 that is apparent in the repeated
cross sections.
Therefore, in the case of panel analysis – and in contrast to the repeated cross-section
45In the context of our initial model, potential log-earnings may be log z0it = µi + νit, (i.e., having a perma-
nent component µi and a transitory component νit). If the transitory component is iid, the mean reversion
phenomenon is likely to occur.
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analysis – stability of the income distribution over time absent the tax change is not sufficient
to ensure identification, and the natural specification (20) may be biased because of mean
reversion due to year-to-year income fluctuations. Mean reversion produces an upward bias in
the panel estimates in the case of a tax increase at the top such as the 1993 tax reform, but
produces a downward bias in the case of a tax rate decrease at the top such as ERTA 1981
or TRA 1986. Ironically, the conventional wisdom, following Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein
(1995), is that repeated cross-section analysis is biased in case of income mobility and that
panel analysis can solve the problem.46 In reality, income mobility with stability of the income
distribution over time does not bias repeated cross-section analysis, but will bias panel analysis
unless the econometric specification controls for mean reversion.
In order to alleviate the mean reversion bias as well as potential changes in income inequal-
ity, following Auten and Carroll (1999), one can add year t0 income controls in regression (20),
either in a simple way by including log zit0 , or in a richer way by including either polynomials
or splines in log zit0 .
47 As shown in Table 2, adding such income controls has a dramatic effect
on the estimates: the estimated elasticities become negative with large absolute values and
large standard errors.48
With only two years of data, adding too many base-year income controls destroys iden-
tification by absorbing much of the independent variation in tax rates, as the instrument–a
dummy for those with incomes in the top 1% in the base year–is a also function of base-year
income. Therefore, we conclude that no convincing estimates of the ETI can be obtained with
a panel analysis using only two years of data when the tax rate changes are concentrated in a
single part of the distribution (such as the top percentile in our example). As we will see in
Section 4, many empirical panel studies use only two years of data and obtain estimates that
are critically sensitive to their base-year income controls.
In order to overcome this issue, one would want to assess whether the numerator of (20)
is uniquely large when a tax reform happens (relative to times when no tax reform happens).
In order to implement this idea, and following Gruber and Saez (2002), we can add additional
years in regression (20) by stacking differences for years 1991 to 1992, 1992 to 1993, ..., 1996
to 1997, and adding year dummies as follows:
log
zit+1
zit
= e · log
(
1− τit+1
1− τit
)
+ f(zit) + αt + εit, (21)
46Feldstein 1995, p. 557, “Although the comparisons of separate cross sections provide much useful infor-
mation, a concern remains about the extent to which the individuals in the same fractile in successive cross
sections are comparable.”
47Decile-based splines are a set of 10 variables. The p-th spline is constant outside decile p (of the distribution
of log income) and varies like log income within the p-th decile.
48Adding base-year income controls in the 1991 to 1994 comparison also makes the elasticity estimates become
negative and very imprecisely estimated.
25
where f(zit) denotes controls in base-year income. In that case, we use as an instrument
1(i ∈ Tt) · 1(t = 1992), i.e., the interaction of being in the top 1% in the base year and the
tax reform year 1992. Table 2 shows that, the elasticity estimate with no base-year income
controls is very large 1.395 (0.296) and falls to around 0.5 to 0.6 when adding base-year income
controls. The key identifying assumption in this case is that, absent the tax change, the extent
of year-to-year mean reversion and year-to-year income inequality changes are stable over the
period 1991 to 1997. Note that the estimates are no longer highly sensitive to the number of
income controls (and as the income controls f(zit) are not year-specific, they do not destroy
the identification).
• Additional Issues in Panel Analysis
A troubling weakness of panel analysis (relative to repeated cross-section analysis) is that
the identification assumptions lack transparency because they mix assumptions regarding mean
reversion and assumptions regarding changes in income inequality. As a result, it is not
possible to draw simple graphs (such as Figure 1) to assess the validity of the panel approach,
especially when base-year income controls are added. Our empirical analysis also reveals a
large sensitivity of panel regressions even in the case where many years are pooled and many
base-year income controls are included (as in Table 2, Panel B2).
First, comparing columns (1) and (2) on Table 2, Panel B2, we note that panel estimates
are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the control group, probably due to differences in mean
reversion across control groups. Therefore, in situations with mean reversion, it is useful to
both increases and decreases in tax rates for identification as mean reversion creates biases in
opposite directions in the case of tax increases vs. tax decreases.
Second, the panel regressions are very sensitive to the choice of the instrument for the
marginal tax rate. We have so far defined the instrument based on membership in the top 1%
group in order to exploit the fact that the 1993 tax change was concentrated among the top
1%. Many studies have instead used as an instrument a predicted change in log net-of-tax
rates assuming that income, often inflation-adjusted income, remains the same as in the base
year (allowing the tax schedule to change).49 Such an instrument has the advantage of taking
account of all changes in the tax rate schedule. In the case of the 1993 reform, the choice of
the instrument should not matter much because the tax rate change was concentrated among
the top 1%. However, the elasticity estimates, shown in the fourth row of Panel B2, are much
smaller when using the predicted change in the log of the net-of-tax tax rate as an instrument.
49We estimated the predicted marginal tax rate in year t + 1 by inflating year t incomes using the inflation
adjustment used in the tax code. As a result, only statutory changes in the tax law such as the top rate
reduction in 1993 or elements of the tax code that are not indexed can produce a change in predicted net-of-tax
rates.
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This may be due to the fact that predicted marginal tax rate changes are sometimes non-zero
due to minor changes in the tax code or various provisions that are not indexed for inflation.
If tax filers are unlikely to respond to such minor changes, this may explain why estimates
using the traditional instrument are smaller than those using the top 1% instrument.
Third, in principle, an “inverted” panel analysis could be carried out by reversing year t0
and year t1 in regression (19). This would amount to selecting the treatment group as those
tax filers who are in the top 1% in the post-reform year t1, in which case the problem of
mean reversion is exactly inverted (Auten and Carroll, 1995 or Giertz 2008b). Some authors
(Carroll, 1998 and Blomquist and Selin, 2009) have also proposed to construct the instrument
based on the average of pre and post-tax income.50 In the case of our example, the treatment
group is defined as tax filers in the top 1% of average pre and post income. Using average
income brings the panel analysis closer to the repeated cross-section analysis as mean reversion
no longer biases the results systematically. Changes in the distribution of income remain a
potential issue, however. Practically, empirical attempts at using such alternative instruments
have shown that estimates are quite sensitive to the choice of instruments, suggesting that the
standard methods do not control fully adequately for mean reversion.
• Advantages of Panel Analysis
Under some assumptions, panel analysis offers several advantages. First, in principle,
panel analysis is useful (relative to repeated cross-section analysis) if individual income in a
base year is a good predictor of income after the reform (absent any tax change). This is
another way of restating that the presence of income mobility weakens the case for using panel
data.51 In reality, there is substantial persistence of income from year to year and therefore
panel estimates tend to have smaller standard errors than repeated cross-section estimates
(keeping sample size the same). In practice, this advantage is counter balanced by the fact
that cross-sectional datasets are often much larger than available panel datasets. Furthermore,
there is a non-negligible fraction of individuals who experience very substantial mobility and
can have a significant influence on panel estimates (based on our computations). This requires
some trimming of outliers in order to obtain more stable estimates.
Second, panel analysis is also useful when one wants to analyze a tax change targeted
to a specific group and there is a concern that the composition of this group will change
significantly over time in the repeated cross sections. Consider again the case of the 1993
reform, which affected the top 1% income earners. Suppose that the increase in the top 1%
50Blomquist and Selin actually use income for a year in between t0 and t1, which is similar in spirit to using
average income.
51To see this, note that in the extreme case where potential incomes z0it were iid, there would be no point in
using panel data.
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income share is due entirely to new tax filers who entered the high-income category in 1993 for
reasons unrelated to the tax change and who were not part of the control group either (e.g.,
a student starting a successful new dot-com company), and that neither the top 1% income
earners nor the next 9% control group in 1992 experienced any change in income (absent the
tax change). In that case, the repeated cross-section analysis is biased because of composition
effects (that change the cross-section distribution of income for non-tax reasons), but the panel
analysis is unbiased because (1) there is no mean reversion among the 1992 top 1% income
earners relative to the control group and (2) there is no change in inequality from 1992 to
1993 between the top 1% and the control group defined based on 1992 incomes. Obviously
these two assumptions never hold exactly, as there is substantial mobility with respect to the
top 1%. For example, Slemrod (1992) reports that in the 1980s, between 28 and 40% of the
households in the top 1% were new from one year to the next.
Finally, panel data are required to study some questions other than the overall response of
reported incomes. For example, if one wants to study how a tax change affects income mobility
(for example, do more middle-income individuals become successful entrepreneurs following a
tax rate cut?), panel data is clearly necessary.
In sum, those considerations lead us to conclude that the advantage of longitudinal analysis
relative to repeated cross-section analysis has been exaggerated in the empirical literature fol-
lowing Feldstein (1995), especially when one wants to analyze tax changes happening primarily
at the top of the income distribution. In that context, we believe that repeated cross-section
analysis or share-based time-series analysis may be a more robust and transparent approach.52
3.4.3 Short-term vs. long-term responses
Figure 1 illustrates the difficulty of obtaining convincing estimates of the elasticity of reported
income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. As we discussed above in our repeated cross-section
analysis and as can be seen in Figure 1, the tax reform of 1993 seems to have generated a
temporary decline in top 1% incomes in 1993 and a temporary spike in 1992 as tax filers tried
to pull reported taxable income from 1993 into 1992 to take advantage of the lower 1992 tax
rate. As a result, the elasticity estimated using only the years 1992 and 1993 is large. For
executives, Goolsbee (2000a) showed that indeed a significant fraction of the response was
due to timing in the realization of stock-options by top executives, and Parcell (1995) and
Sammartino and Weiner (1997) document the extent of year-end re-timing of taxable income.
In that case, we would expect the long-term response to be much smaller. As Table 2, Panel A1
52Obviously, access to panel data is never worse than access to repeated cross-sectional data, as it is always
possible to ignore the longitudinal aspect of panel data and carry out a repeated cross-section analysis with
panel data.
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documented, using 1991 to 1994 in the basic repeated cross-section regression (13) generates
a negative elasticity.
The central question is whether the clearly visible short-term responses persist over time.
In particular, how should we interpret the continuing rise in top incomes after 1994? If one
thinks that this surge is evidence of diverging trends between high-income individuals and
the rest of the population independent of tax policy, then the long-term response to the tax
change is arguably close to zero. Alternatively, one could argue that the surge in top incomes
since the mid-1990s was the long-term consequence of the decrease in tax rates in the 1980s
and that such a surge would not have occurred had high-income tax rates remained as high as
they were in the 1960s and 1970s. It is unfortunately impossible to disentangle those various
scenarios with a single time series of top incomes and top tax rates. As mentioned above,
cross-country time-series analysis might be a fruitful area to make progress, taking advantage
of varying time patterns of tax rate changes.
The literature on capital gains realizations has proposed dynamic micro-econometrics mod-
els in order to estimate simultaneously short-term and long-term responses to tax changes (see
e.g., Burman and Randolph, 1994). In the case of the ETI, such explicit modelling has only
been used in a few studies (Holmlund and Soderstrom, 2008, Giertz, 2008b, and Heim, 2007
and 2009). These papers augment the traditional panel specification (21) by adding a lagged
change in marginal tax rate term (and sometimes a prospective rate change term). If some
components of taxable income respond with a one-year lag then, in principle, the lagged term
will capture this effect. This method could be useful to disentangle short-term from medium-
term responses, although compelling identification is difficult.
3.4.4 Alternative control groups
The tax code offers some possibilities to generate alternative control groups that might be more
comparable to treatment groups than the lower-income groups used in the analysis above. For
example, inflation (before the inflation adjustment of the tax schedule after TRA 1986) or the
loss of a personal exemption can also push taxpayers into a higher bracket, and in some cases
married and unmarried couples experience different changes in their tax schedules. Those
changes have been explored by Saez (2003), Looney and Singhal (2006) and Singleton (2007),
respectively.53 The advantage of those changes is that one can compare taxpayers who are
very similar – but by being on opposite sides of a bracket threshold face different marginal tax
rates – and hence potentially obtain a much more convincing identification.
53In Singleton’s case, the focus is on individual earned income and EGTRRA’s provision to reduce the
marriage penalty. The provision substantially lowered marginal tax rates for some middle-income married
couples, while not changing rates for single filers with similar incomes.
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The main drawback of this strategy is that taxpayers may not be aware of the minute de-
tails of the tax code, and hence might not respond to very localized changes in their marginal
tax rate situation. As a result, elasticities obtained from those studies might not be rele-
vant to predict behavioral responses to well-advertised, more salient, and broader tax rate
changes. This lack of perfect information might also explain why there does not appear to
be significant bunching at the kink points of the tax schedule (Saez 2009) as predicted in the
standard model.54 Chetty et al. (2009) use Danish tax return data and show that large kinks
generate disproportionately stronger bunching responses than small kinks, consistent with the
the hypothesis that tax filers are not paying as much attention to small changes than to large
changes. As a result, elasticities estimated from large changes may be larger than elastici-
ties estimated from small changes, an important point formally developed in Chetty (2009).
Second, from a modelling perspective, as informational considerations are a central aspect of
the size of the behavioral response, it is important to develop models of how individuals learn
about a budget set and its consequences for the optimal design of tax and transfer policies.
Tax response analysis thus faces this fundamental difficulty: large reforms are the most
likely to be noticed and understood by taxpayers, but rarely generate fully convincing control
groups for identification. Small reforms or quirks in the tax code can generate better control
groups, but might not lead to meaningful, generalizable estimates if most taxpayers are not
aware of such tax changes or provisions.55
3.4.5 Tax base changes
Although estimation of the ETI focuses on changes in the schedule of tax rates, the definition
of the tax base subject to the rate schedule also changes periodically, often at the same time
the rates change as part of comprehensive tax reform legislation. This raises a number of issues
that are especially important when, as in TRA86, multiple tax base changes accompanied the
tax rate changes, and are much less important for the 1993 change, when the top marginal
tax rate changed with little base definition change. That tax rates changes often coincide
with changes in the definition of taxable income is not a coincidence, because the theme of
many income tax reforms since the 1980s has been to broaden the tax base and lower the rates
applied to the base in a revenue-neutral way.
First, identifying the taxable income elasticity when the tax base changes becomes problem-
atic because the taxable income elasticity is plausibly different in the post-reform era compared
54Chetty and Saez (2009) show that providing information to EITC recipients does produce changes in
subsequent reported incomes, indicating that tax filers do not have perfect information about the tax system.
55Chetty (2009) develops an econometric method to set bounds on elasticities when responses are incomplete
due to lack of awareness from tax filers.
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to the pre-reform era. For example, TRA86 broadened the tax base by both reducing deduc-
tions and the attractiveness of tax “shelters.” It is likely that, due to these changes, the taxable
income elasticity post-TRA86 was lower than pre-TRA86, as documented by Kopczuk (2005).
In this situation even an otherwise well-specified estimation strategy will yield an estimate of
neither the pre- nor post-reform elasticity, but rather a weighted average of the two, where
the weights need not be positive.
Second, when the definition of the tax base changes, using as the dependent variable
a concurrent definition of taxable income runs the risk of confounding tax-induced changes
in behavior with purely definitional changes. For example, the base broadening of TRA86
would, ceteris paribus, show taxable incomes to have increased, perhaps to different degrees at
different income levels.56 This problem suggests using either a consistent pre- or post-reform
definition.57 When the issue is changing deductions or credits, for data availability reasons
it is generally easier to use the broader definition (i.e., not net of the deductions), because
otherwise the investigator needs, but will not have, measures of deductions or credits that are
not reported in the year with the broader base; the argument is reversed when new sources of
income are added to the tax base. Because the former type of broadening was more prevalent,
those studying TRA86 have attempted to analyze a post-TRA86 definition of taxable income;
this cannot, though, be done in a completely satisfactory manner.
Even if a consistent measure of taxable income could be constructed, the choice of which
constant-law definition of taxable income to use is by no means an innocuous one.58 If the
objective is to estimate the leakage from a given base when the rate of tax is altered, either
method has problems. As discussed in Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), the response to a
reform that changes both the marginal tax rate and the tax base does not, without further
assumptions, reveal the impact of a tax change for a given base. If the broader definition
of taxable income is used, the measured response mixes two things: the response of the old
base to an increase in the net-of-tax rate, and the response of the newly-included base to a
decrease in the net-of-tax rate. The response of tax base to the decline in tax rate probably
understates its response when the tax base is constant. On the other hand, the response of
the pre-reform base will probably overestimate the partial elasticity of the base with respect
to a change in the tax rate. Using a consistent post-reform definition will produce a change in
56This is why Slemrod (1996) adjusted downward the post-TRA86 Feenberg and Poterba (1993) measures of
the high-income shares; otherwise, the change from including 40% of capital gains in taxable income in the years
up to 1986 to 100% inclusion afterward would increase the measured high-income share even in the absence of
any behavioral response.
57Alternatively one could, like Kopczuk (2005), employ a model where independent variables account for
changes to the tax base.
58An exception would be if the elasticity of substitution between activities whose tax status changes and
those whose status does not change equals zero (Heim, 2007).
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taxable income that is less than what is obtained using the pre-reform definition.
An excellent example of this issue concerns interest deductions. TRA86 eliminated the
deductibility of consumer interest, and Maki (1996) and others have noted that there was a
large shift into still-deductible, and highly substitutable, home equity loans. Using the post-
TRA86 definition will include in the measured taxable income change the decline in consumer
interest, and cause a downward bias in the estimate of the change in taxable income with
respect to a tax rate change.
3.5 Multiple tax rates: The special case of capital gains realizations
Another complicating factor is capital gains. Although real accrued gains are income according
to the Haig-Simons definition, those countries that tax capital gains at all do so upon realization
(usually sale), and those countries that do tax realizations now generally subject them to a
lower rate than applies to other income. In the United States, the extent of preferential tax
has varied significantly since 1980. Before TRA86, 40% of long-term gains were included in
taxable income; with a top rate of 50%, the top rate on realizations was 20%. When the
TRA86 lowered the top rate to 28%, the exclusion was eliminated, so that the top rate on
long-term capital gains was also 28%. Since TRA86, the top rate on ordinary income has
risen and a preferential rate re-introduced; since 2003, the two rates have been 35% and 15%,
respectively.59
Almost all studies of the ETI in the U.S. have excluded capital gains realizations from the
measure of taxable income or broad income, on the reasonable grounds that they are generally
subject to a different marginal tax rate than other income. It is also true that they are
especially responsive to anticipated changes in the applicable tax rate. (See Burman, Clausing
and O’Hare, 1994).
Ignoring capital gains completely, though, raises some difficult issues. As background,
in the United States, they constitute a very large fraction of the taxable income of the top
income groups.60 Second, they fluctuate year-to-year much more than other income, both in
the aggregate and, especially, for given taxpayers. Thus, for example, much of the year-to-year
change in which taxpayers are in the top 1% income group, capital gains included, may be due
to changes in capital gains realizations.
Taxpayers often have many opportunities for converting wage and salary income to capital
gains income – and these opportunities are exercised when the tax advantages of so doing are
59Additionally, many gains that accrue as tax-preferred savings are never taxed, as is the case for savings in
401k plans, IRAs and the various education savings accounts.
60In 2005, for example, for taxpayers with AGI exceeding $500,000, who represent just less than 1% of all
taxable returns, taxable net capital gain comprised 33.3% of AGI, compared to 3.8% of AGI for all other taxable
returns.
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sufficient. Because the tax advantage depends on the differential between the rate on ordinary
income and capital gains, this rate matters and should ideally be controlled for in analyses
of how the tax rate on ordinary income affects the reported amount of ordinary income.
Furthermore, converting ordinary income to capital gains income often is accompanied by
deferral of the realization of the latter for tax purposes, so the offsetting revenue may not
come for several years, if ever.
In microeconometric analysis, the standard procedure is to calculate the marginal tax rate
on ordinary income assuming no capital gains income. This would be appropriate if decisions
that trigger ordinary income were made before decisions regarding capital gains realizations,
but this is unrealistic and thus this procedure causes error in measuring the actual MTR.
The same issues arise in share analysis. Slemrod (1996) includes capital gains in his measure
of adjusted gross income, and includes as explanatory variables the top rates on both ordinary
income and capital gains. He finds no evidence that a higher capital gains tax rate is associated
with a higher share of wages and salaries, though.61
In a related model with individual-level data, Hall and Liebman (2000) and Eissa and
Giertz (2007) examine the relationship between corporate, personal income and capital gains
tax rates and the share of compensation that CEOs and other executives receive in the form
of stock options. Over the past couple of decades, stock options have been the largest source
of growth in compensation for top executives (Murphy, 1999). While Hall and Liebman (2000)
show that the advantages of paying executives with stock options are directly related to the
capital gains tax rate and inversely related to the corporate and personal income tax rates,
neither their paper nor Giertz and Eissa’s reports well-identified estimates for the magnitude
of the income shifting.
Ideally, one would need a model of joint determination of capital gains and ordinary income
as a function of the marginal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income in the general
methodology of the elasticity of taxable income.
3.6 Income Shifting: The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses
We have seen in the previous section that estimating taxable income elasticities in a fully
convincing way is challenging because of the difficulty of untangling tax-related from non-
tax-related changes in reported incomes. Furthermore, our conceptual analysis in Section 2
showed that, in addition to measuring the reported income elasticity, to obtain a welfare-
relevant elasticity it is important to assess fiscal externalities. A way to make progress on
61Saez (2004) excludes capital gains from his measure of adjusted gross income and does not include a measure
of the tax rate applying to capital gains in his analysis.
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those two issues is to analyze the “anatomy of the behavioral response” (Slemrod, 1996) by
examining the components of reported income.
Figure 2 (updated from Saez 2004) displays the share and composition of the top 0.01%
income earners in the U.S. since the 1960s along with the average marginal tax rate they face
(in bold line on the right y-axis). We focus on this very top group because tax rate changes
and tax responses are the strongest and most salient at the very top. We have divided income
into seven income components: (1) wages and salaries (which include bonuses and profits
from exercised stock options), (2) dividends, (3) interest income, (4) sole proprietorship profits
(profits from small businesses that are fully owned by the taxpayer, this includes most forms of
self-employment income), (5) partnership profits (profits from businesses where the taxpayer
is a partner such as a law or medical practice partnership), (6) profits from subchapter S
corporations, and (7) other income. Subchapter S corporations (as opposed to subchapter C
corporations) are corporations which are not subject to the corporate income tax and whose
profits are taxable directly and solely at the individual level (on the individual income tax
returns of owners). Hence S-corporations do not face the double tax of regular C-corporations
(C-corporations pay the corporate income tax on their profits.)
Four points are worth noting about Figure 2. First, the top 0.01% income earners faced
extremely high marginal tax rates in the early 1960s (around 80%) which were reduced sig-
nificantly by the Kennedy tax cuts in 1964-5 (to about 65%). This implies a 75% increase
in the net-of-tax rate, a much larger increase than the ERTA 1981 and TRA 1986 tax rate
reductions. In spite of this large rate cut, the top 0.01% income share remains flat in the
1960s, and well into the 1970s, suggesting a complete absence of behavioral response in both
the short and the long run. This stands in contrast to the sharp response of the top 0.01%
income share to the 1981 and 1986 tax changes, consistent with the view that the elasticity is
not an immutable parameter but instead depends on the tax system.
Second, Figure 2 shows clearly that about one-third of the response to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 from 1986 to 1988 is due to a surge in S-corporation income.62 Partnership income
also rose dramatically immediately after TRA 1986, mostly because of the disappearance of
partnership losses. The sudden jump in S-corporation income, exactly at the time of the tax
reform, strongly suggests that this was the consequence of a one-time shift of taxable income
from the corporate sector, and the one-time closing of the partnership loss tax shelters (Slemrod
1996, Gordon and Slemrod 2000). The surge in business income reported on individual returns
in the 1980s thus cannot be interpreted as a “supply-side” success, as most of those individual
income gains came either at the expense of taxable corporate income, or were obtained from
62ERTA 1981 also produced a sudden increase of S-corporation income (which was negligible up to 1981),
which explains most of the increase in top incomes from 1981 to 1984, first documented by Lindsey (1987).
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the closing of tax shelters by imposing stricter rules on losses from passive businesses.
Third, Figure 2 displays a dramatic shift in the composition of very top incomes away from
dividends (which represented more than 60% of top incomes in the early 1960s) toward wage
income and S-corporation and partnership income. In the early 1960s, the top 0.01% incomes
were facing extremely high marginal tax rates of about 80% on average, while tax rates on
long-term capital gains were around 25%. Thus, dividends were a very disadvantaged form of
income for the rich, suggesting that those top income earners had little control over the form
of payment, and thus might have been in large part passive investors. The Kennedy tax cuts
apparently did not reduce the top individual rate enough (the top rate became 70%) to make
the S-corporation form attractive relative to the C-corporation form, explaining perhaps the
contrast in behavioral responses between the Kennedy tax cuts episodes and the tax changes of
the 1980s. Interestingly, Figure 2 also displays an increase in the dividend income component
after 2003, when the tax rate on dividend income was lowered to 15%.63
Fourth and related, the wage income component of the top 0.01% has experienced a dra-
matic secular growth since the 1970s. The wage component exhibits clear spikes in 1988 and
1992, which are likely to reflect short-term responses to the tax changes due to re-timing of
compensation.64 The difficult question to resolve is whether the secular growth in top wage
incomes is due to the dramatic decline in top marginal tax rates since the 1960s. This ques-
tion cannot be resolved solely looking at U.S. evidence. Evidence from other countries on the
pattern of top incomes and top tax rates (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010) suggests that
reducing top tax rates to levels below 50% is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition to
produce a surge in top incomes. Countries such as the United States or the United King-
dom have experienced both a dramatic reduction in top tax rates and a surge in top incomes
(Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2008), while other countries such as Japan have also experienced
significant declines in top tax rates but no comparable surge in top incomes over recent decades
(Moriguchi and Saez, 2008).
Overall, the compositional graph displayed on Figure 2 casts significant light on the
anatomy of the behavioral response and allows us to distinguish short-term from long-term
effects, as well as effects due to income shifting from the corporate base to the individual base
or due to tighter regulations regarding business losses. Therefore, we believe that moving away
from the “taxable income elasticity” paradigm and (back) to a more granular understanding
of the various components of behavioral responses to taxation is fruitful both to predict the
63This is consistent with the firm-based analysis of Chetty and Saez (2005) who show that dividends paid
out by publicly traded US companies rose sharply after the dividend tax cut was enacted.
64There is also a very large spike in 2000 that is likely due to the boom and bust in the dot-com sector, where
stock-option exercises peaked in 2000 before collapsing in 2001 and 2002.
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effects of future tax reforms as well as to analyze the overall welfare and fiscal consequences
of actual tax changes.
4 Empirical Analysis
Most of the empirical literature on the ETI has focused on individual taxable income in the
U.S., although some studies have examined individual taxable income in Canada and Western
Europe.65 To examine the literature and investigate the challenges associated with attempts
to estimate the ETI, we first review those studies that analyze legislated changes in U.S.
federal (and to a lesser extent, state) marginal tax rates. In the next subsection, we consider
unlegislated variation in U.S. tax rates, which both solves some issues inherent in analyzing
legislated tax rate changes and creates new difficulties. Then we examine studies that have
estimated the ETI for other countries. We emphasize how, and how well, each study addresses
the methodological issues discussed in the previous section.
4.1 Empirical Analysis based on U.S. Legislated Tax Changes
4.1.1 Analysis Using Repeated-Cross-Section Data
Lindsey (1987) was the first to estimate something akin to an elasticity of taxable income
(although his income measure is actually much closer to AGI).66 He uses repeated cross-sections
of tax return data from 1979 to make post-ERTA projections of the income distribution based
on pre-ERTA law and the macroeconomic conditions existing in the intervening years. Lindsey
splits the data into income groups and regresses the log deviations of average income (relative
to projected average income assuming no tax change) on the log change in the group average
net-of-tax rate. His core estimates of the ETI lie between 1.6 and 1.8, and finds evidence
suggesting that higher-income groups have higher elasticities. This methodology is essentially
a difference-in-difference method based on income shares. Very large elasticities are obtained
because top incomes grew faster than lower incomes from 1981 to 1984 (as we showed in Figure
1). The key identification assumption is that absent the tax change, the income distribution
65See Gruber and Rauh (2007) for an estimate of the elasticity of reported corporate income that uses data
from Compustat for 1960 to 2003 and a methodology similar to that of Gruber and Saez (2002). There is
little graduation in marginal tax rates for corporate income, so variation is achieved by constructing a marginal
effective tax rate for each industry. They regress log income for each industry against the instrumented log of the
effective tax rate, year dummies (after first-differencing, consecutive years’ data), and a 10-piece lagged-income
spline. Their baseline ETI estimate for corporate taxable income is 0.2.
66Although he acknlowledges that a number of others, including Minarik (1984) and Simonson (1984a,b), had
noted that the share of taxable income reported by high-income taxpayers rose after ERTA reduced the top
marginal tax rate.
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would not have changed (except for the macro-economic aggregates Lindsey controls for).67
For the most part, repeated-cross-section data have not been used to estimate the ETI
since Lindsey (1987). One exception is Goolsbee (1999), who uses it to investigate the ETI
for key U.S. tax changes from 1920 to 1966 (excluding those during World War II). Return-
level data are not available for this time period, so Goolsbee uses aggregated data.68 He
employs two different methods to estimate the ETI—tabulated difference-in-differences, and
a regression-based strategy.
In the regression-based strategy, he regresses the change in log income against the change
in the log average net-of-tax rate by income group. As a benchmark, he first applies this
methodology to TRA 86, and obtains an estimate of the ETI of approximately 1. For the five
episodes between 1920 and 1966, he finds ETI estimates ranging from -0.83 to 0.59, and for
several episodes the ETI is not significantly different from zero. Goolsbee speculates that the
smaller ETI estimates prior to 1980 are due both to increases in the true ETI over time due to
“institutional or other factors” as well as the importance of particular upward biases affecting
ETI estimates based on the tax changes in the 1980s, discussed later.
4.1.2 Analysis Using Aggregated Time-Series Data
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) were the first to use aggregate tax return data to shed light
on the high-income share of reported aggregate income in the United States and to what
extent this might be influenced by changes in the tax rate structure.They calculate for 1951 to
1990 the share of AGI and several components of AGI that were received by the top 0.5% of
households ranked by AGI. Consistently with Figure 1 reported in Section 3.3, the four-decade
time series is sharply U-shaped, beginning with a steady decline from over 8% in the early
1950s to just below 6% around 1970. Then, after being approximately flat at about 6.0%
from 1970 to 1981, the high-income share of income begins in 1982 to increase continuously to
7.7% in 1985, then jumps sharply in 1986 to 9.2%. There is a slight increase in 1987 to 9.5%,
then another sharp increase in 1988 to 12.1%. Although they conduct no formal analysis of
67Interestingly, Navratil (1995a) re-examines the analysis of Lindsey using the Continuous Work History
Sample (CWHS) panel (see Appendix B.1) of tax returns for years 1979 to 1981 and 1983. In one exercise,
Navratil treats different years of his panel as repeated cross-sections and estimates an elasticity of 1.99 (similar
to Lindsey’s estimates). When exploiting the properties of the panel, though, Navratil reports much smaller
estimates, ranging from 0.78 to 0.84, with an estimated ETI of 1.38 for those in the top rate bracket. This
illustrates well the issue of mean reversion we discussed in Section 3: top incomes did not increase as much in
the panel as in the repeated cross-section.
68Goolsbee interpolates portions of the income distribution as necessary by assuming a Pareto distribution.
He studies taxable income, but in his interpolation holds the relationship between taxable income and AGI
constant, which forces deduction and itemization responses to be constant over time. Thus, his results are
effectively for AGI. Note that the literature is not very strict in its income definition when measuring the ETI,
and papers focusing on AGI (as opposed to taxable income) often refer to their results as estimated ETIs.
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the data they calculate, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) argue that the time-series pattern they
find is consistent with a behavioral response to the reductions in the top marginal tax rate,
especially during the TRA 86 episode.
Slemrod (1996) uses high-income share data for 1954 to 199069 to examine in a regression
framework the tax and non-tax causes of inequality. The data up to 1986 are taken directly
from Feenberg and Poterba (1993), but the data from 1987 to 1990 are adjusted to correspond
to a pre-TRA 86 definition of AGI so as to get closer to a consistent definition over time.
Dependent variables studied include the high-income share of AGI and four components of
income. Explanatory variables in the regressions include measures of the contemporaneous,
one-year-lagged, and one-year-leading top tax rates for both ordinary individual income and
long-term capital gains.70 To control for exogenous, non-tax-related, income trends, also in-
cluded are a measure of earnings inequality between the 90th and 10th percentiles not based on
tax return data and some macroeconomic variables that might differentially influence incomes
at different percentiles (the real level of stock prices and the average nominal corporate AAA
bond rate). He separately performs regressions for the years up to 1985 and for the years up
to 1990 to investigate whether or not there was a break in the structure of the model in 1986.
Consistent with the evidence we reported on Figure 1 in Section 3.3, Slemrod (1996) finds
that up to 1985 decreases in the top tax rate on individual income play almost no role in
explaining the variation in the high-income share of AGI; indeed, more than two-fifths of the
increase in high-income share between 1973 and 1985 can be associated with the increase in
90-10 wage inequality. However, when data up to 1990 are included in the regression, the
coefficient on the top tax rate term becomes large in absolute value and significant.
After analyzing different pieces of AGI, including wages and salaries, Subchapter S income,
and partnerships, Slemrod (1996) concludes that the regression results point to the impact of
the new tax base structure instituted by TRA 86. This new structure provided very different
incentives and opportunities for high-income individuals to report income (and losses) via the
individual tax system. He cautions that the results do not necessarily imply that taxpayer re-
sponse to marginal tax rates, holding the structure constant, was higher post-TRA 86. Instead
the tax rate variables, which changed dramatically at the same time the structure changed,
are picking up some of the effect of this structural change.71 Because of the simultaneity of
the tax rate changes and scores of tax base changes, the high tax rate elasticity estimated over
the sample up to 1990 is not an unbiased estimate of the true elasticity, either before or after
69Slemrod examines both the top 0.5% as well as the top 1% of taxpayers, although all regressions exclusively
use the top 0.5%.
70For individual income, he uses the AGI-weighted difference between the tax rate for the top 0.5% and the
rate for everyone else. For capital gains, only the maximum rate is used.
71Fullerton (1996), in a comment on Slemrod (1996), emphasized this interpretation.
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the reform.
Saez (2004) examines IRS data from 1960 to 2000.72 He runs regressions of top 1% log
average income on the log average net-of-tax rate for the top 1% over the time period. Con-
sistently with our findings from Section 3.3 (Table 1), he finds large elasticities, even when
including time trends or instrumenting the log net-of-tax rate using the statutory top marginal
tax rate.
Saez (2004) goes on to investigate which categories of his income measure are responsible
for its size, primarily in order to ascertain to what extent the estimated ETIs reflect income
shifting. He, like Slemrod (1996), finds a break in the series following TRA86. When he
examines categories of gross income, he finds that income shifting can explain most of the rise
in Subchapter S and partnership income. What remains unclear is whether any portion of the
wage and salary growth is attributable to the marginal decline in taxes, or is simply another
form of income shifting. Saez concludes that it is very difficult to distinguish the long-term
effect of tax cuts from a non-tax related secular widening in the disparity of earnings.
4.1.3 Analysis using panel data
The seminal study using panel data was Feldstein (1995), who investigated the response to
TRA 86 using the U.S. public-use panel tax data (see Appendix B.1).73 Feldstein (1995)
groups taxpayers by their 1985 marginal tax rates and uses a tabulated difference-in-differences
methodology to estimate the ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate. Specifically, to compute
elasticities the percentage change in taxable income (relative to adjusted 1985 income) in
each group is compared to the change in the average net-of-tax-rate in each group. Feldstein
obtains large ETI estimates, ranging from 1 to 3 in alternative specifications. Although based
on a much smaller sample (Feldstein’s top group included only 57 tax returns), the Feldstein
(1995) results apparently corroborated the conclusion of Feenberg and Poterba (1993) based on
observing the time-series of share-of-income data that something extraordinary had happened
to the dispersion of taxable income at the same time as TRA86.
Auten and Carroll (1995) reexamine and build directly on Feldstein’s analysis of TRA86
using the much larger panel data available within Treasury (see appendix B.1). They compare
72To obtain a consistent income definition, he excludes capital gains and government transfers (note that
this is an even broader measure than AGI). Slemrod (1996) excludes capital gains but analyzes capital gains
separately; Feenberg and Poterba (1993) begin their analysis with an income definition that includes capital
gains but, after noting problems with its inclusion, conduct analysis that excludes capital gains from the income
definition.
73In his sample, Feldstein includes only married taxpayers filing jointly who were under age 65 in 1988 and
for whom both 1985 and 1988 tax returns are available. Those with incomes below $21,020 in 1985 are not
included in the sample. Individuals who filed Subchapter S income only in 1988 are also excluded. Capital
gains are excluded. There were also other miscellaneous adjustments. This leaves less than 4000 observations.
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tax returns in 1989 and 1985.74 Auten and Carroll find that moving from the small publicly
available sample Feldstein used to the much larger sample they can use reduces substantially
the estimated elasticities from around 2 to around 0.60 for taxable income (even using exactly
the same regression based methodology). However, even with the richer dataset, Auten and
Carroll note that their ETI estimates are “highly sensitive” to specification decisions regarding
whether to weight observations by income or by population. For example, with the full set
of controls, the elasticity of taxable income is 1.09 when population-weighted, and 0.60 when
income-weighted. For the elasticity of AGI, the estimates are 0.90 and -0.09, respectively.75
In another reexamination of Feldstein (1995), Navratil (1995b) made the point discussed
in Section 3.4.2 that Feldstein’s difference-in-difference approach is sensitive to the choice of
groups and critically assumes that elasticities are constant across groups. In order to relax
the assumption of equal elasticities across income groups, Navratil looks at the same group of
taxpayers before and after TRA 86, but instead of using another income group for comparison,
he uses a similarly defined group over a period where tax rates did not change. Consistently
with our description in Section 3.3, Navratil reports estimated ETIs as high as 1 for the top
3% of the income distribution, but much smaller estimates for the rest of the distribution. The
population-weighted average ETI estimate is 0.37. Navratil’s estimates are, however, sensitive
to the choice of comparison years and to the definition of taxable income.
Subsequent research using panel data focused on addressing issues such as mean reversion,
marginal tax rate endogeneity, and secular income trends, which likely plagued some of the
earlier studies. Auten and Carroll (1999) address mean reversion and attempt to control
for divergence within the income distribution by including control variables for region and
occupation. Auten and Carroll adopt a two-stage least-squares regression approach, regressing
the change in constant-law (log) AGI76 between 1985 and 1989 against the change in the log
of the net-of-tax rate and a set of other exogenous variables. They instrument for the change
in the net-of-tax rate by inflating adjusted 1985 incomes by the CPI to 1989 levels and then
applying 1989 law to these incomes, as discussed in Section 3.4.2.77 When adding non-tax
factors that may have been correlated with the rise in income inequality over this period (such
as age, age-squared, occupation, region, and notably 1985 income), they report an elasticity
74The sample includes only married taxpayers filing joint returns, ages 25 to 55, who were at or above the
22% marginal tax bracket (i.e., at least $21,020 joint, $15,610 single) in 1985. Also excluded are AMT filers
and those who report Subchapter S income in 1989, but not in 1985.
75Interestingly, their population-weighted estimates are higher than the income-weighted estimates. The
opposite is found in most other studies that have produced both population- and income-weighted estimates.
76The constant-law calculations are based on post-TRA 86. They do a robustness test and find that using
pre-TRA 86 laws does not significantly change the results.
77They calculate this by inflating 1985 taxable income to 1989 and calculating the corresponding tax rates
under 1989 law using the NBER TAXSIM tax calculator. For an overview of TAXSIM, see Feenberg and Coutts
(1993).
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estimate of 0.55. However, when employing the inverted panel approach (discussed in Section
4), their estimate doubles to 1.13. This result is consistent with mean reversion, as their
estimate is much larger when the data ordering simulates a tax increase (or a rising NTR). As
discussed in Section 3.4.2, no fully convincing estimate of the ETI can be obtained using only
two years of data when tax rate changes are concentrated at the top.
Carroll (1998) applies a similar methodology to the tax increases of the 1990s—OBRA 90
and OBRA 93. He uses the SOI data set for a group of taxpayers from 1989 to 1995.78 Because
these tax acts did not include many base changes, examining this time period eliminates issues
associated with concurrent tax base definition changes that complicate analysis of TRA 86.
He uses year-to-year (log) income changes as his dependent variable (i.e., he differences over
one-year intervals). Although he emphasizes the value of looking at pairs of years both with
and without intervening tax rate changes, focusing on one-year changes also likely means that
his estimates are capturing transitory responses as opposed to longer-term shifts in behavior.
To control for tax-rate endogeneity, Carroll estimates 2SLS regressions, basing his instru-
ment on the tax rate corresponding to each filer’s average income over the seven-year period,
meant to proxy for permanent income. Note, however, that this instrument is a function of
post-reform income and hence is endogenous, as discussed in Section 3.4.2. To control for
non-tax factors, he includes year dummies, age, age-squared, occupation, region, financial
wealth, and the number of dependent children. The resulting elasticity estimate is 0.38 for
adjusted taxable income and 0.32 for gross income; excluding more returns at the low end of
the distribution by raising the exclusion to $75,000 increases the estimated elasticity to 0.56.
Both Auten and Carroll (1999) and Carroll (1998) use dummy variables for occupation as a
control for non-tax factors that might have differentially affected income growth over the period
spanning the tax change. The idea is that a differing occupational mix may explain a given
income group’s different percentage change in taxable income. However, to the extent that
one’s occupation reflects the flexibility to alter work schedules or compensation arrangements
in response to tax rate changes (i.e., different elasticities), inclusion of these variables may
affect the interpretation of the estimated elasticity. By interacting the occupation dummies
with the net-of-tax rate, Auten and Carroll produce estimated elasticities that are allowed to
differ by occupation. In fact, the estimated elasticities do vary greatly by occupation, being
as high as 2.9 for “investors,”1.65 for the self-employed and farmers, and 1.63 for executives
and managers.79
78Prior to Carroll, Sammartino and Weiner (1997) analyze a panel of tax returns from 1989 to 1994 and
find large transitory responses (of AGI) surrounding the tax acts of the 1990s, but conclude that longer-term
responses are likely much smaller. They do not, though, estimate taxable income elasticities.
79Note, however, these interacted estimates are only reported for gross (and not taxable) income.
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Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) investigate behavioral responses to TRA 86, using panel data
from the 1983 and 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) instead of income tax return
data.80 Due to data limitations, they study an income concept close to AGI rather than tax-
able income. When using Feldstein’s (1995) approach, they report tax elasticities for AGI from
1.76 to 1.99, similar to Feldstein’s taxable income elasticity estimates. Moffitt and Wilhelm
then turn to a two-stage least-squares regression approach, employing several alternative in-
struments for the change in the net-of-tax rate,81 including education and measures of illiquid
assets, and conclude that those instruments that are successful in discriminating between the
high-income group and the balance of the population yield tax elasticity estimates that range
from 0.35 to 0.97. As Auten and Carroll (1999), such estimates based on comparing only 2
years are sensitive to mean reversion. Indeed, when including 1983 AGI as a control for mean
reversion, their elasticities increase by between 0.3 and 0.5; recall that TRA86 compressed
MTRs, so mean reversion biases downward estimated ETIs. Because SCF data include labor
supply measures (hours of work), they also estimate labor supply response and conclude that
the surge in the taxable income of high-income individuals between 1983 and 1989 was not
accompanied by an increase in reported hours of work.
Gruber and Saez (2002) use the public-use version of the CWHS panel for the years 1979
to 1990 to examine taxable income responses to both ERTA and TRA 86.82 They study
the response of two different measures of income. The first is called “broad income,” which
equals AGI plus “adjustments” such as IRA contributions, but it does not include capital
gains. The other is a concept close to taxable income that accounts for itemized deductions
and adjustments that are reported for all years from 1979 to 1990, but also does not include
capital gains. They measure behavioral changes (between paired observations) over three-year
intervals, which provides them with variation in tax rates across time for all income levels.
Furthermore, because they incorporate state as well as federal income tax changes, they also
have cross-sectional variations in tax rate changes within income groups.83
Gruber and Saez devote much attention to the issues of mean reversion and secular income
trends, and separately estimate income and substitution effects of the tax change. They
80They limit their data set to male heads of household, ages 25 to 53 in 1983, who worked over 200 hours,
and who also appear in the 1989 sample. For their analysis, they also restrict the sample to observations with
positive AGI, and a marginal tax rate above 0.2. Their resulting sample size is 406.
81Because it has much richer demographic information than the tax-return data, the SCF data set provides
a much wider range of potential instruments for the net-of-tax rate.
82They exclude filers below $10,000 in the first year of the difference to control for mean reversion. Filers are
not necessarily the same for all nine years. Thus, they can include only filers for which they can construct at
least one three-year difference. In total, the nine sets of differences provide approximately 100,000 observations.
They make no exclusions for changes in Subchapter S income across years.
83Auten and Carroll (1995 and 1999) also used state tax rates, but it mattered little because they were still
only using two years of data.
42
instrument for the change in the net-of-tax rate using an instrument very similar to that used
by Auten and Carroll (1999): the change in the net-of-tax rate assuming each filer’s income
grows at the rate of the overall nominal income growth between the base and subsequent year.
They also construct an analogous instrument for capturing the income effect. They include the
change in the log of after-tax income as an explanatory variable, but instrument for it using
the log change in after-tax income again assuming that base year income grows at the same
rate as total income. The second stage regresses the log of (taxable or broad) income growth
against the change in the log of the after-tax rate, year fixed effects, and dummies for marital
status. As they use multiple years simultaneously, they can include a rich set of controls for
base income.
Looking at other income definitions, and analyzing subsets of their overall results gives fur-
ther insight into the behavioral response to tax changes. Gruber and Saez’s elasticity estimate
for broad income, 0.12, is much smaller than their corresponding estimate for taxable income,
suggesting that much of the taxable income response comes through deductions, exemptions,
and exclusions. Additionally, they find that most of the response can be attributed to item-
izers (for taxable income, the elasticity is 0.647, whereas for non-itemizers, it is negative and
insignificant). Although estimates by income group are not statistically distinguishable from
each other, they do vary greatly and are generally higher for higher-income taxpayers (0.57 for
people with incomes over $100,000, 0.11 for those from $50,000-$100,000 and 0.18 for those
with income from $10,000 to $50,000).
Kopczuk (2005) analyzes the 1979 to 1990 public-use version of the CWHS panel to inves-
tigate the hypothesis that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but rather a function of the
tax base (which he defines as taxable income divided by total income). Available deductions
lower the cost of shifting income outside the tax base; as the tax base becomes smaller, respon-
siveness to changes in tax rates increases. After first-differencing (he uses three-year intervals,
following the methodology of Gruber and Saez (2002)), he uses a two-stage least-squares ap-
proach with instruments for both the change in the log net-of-tax rate and for the interaction
of that variable with the share of income that is deductible. For instruments, he uses the log
of the predicted changes of these variables, absent any behavioral response. Including both
the instrumented changes in marginal tax rates and an interaction term between the change
in tax rate and change in tax base, generates estimates for the elasticity of broad income of
0.003 and 0.727, respectively. For taxable income, the respective income-weighted elasticities
are 0.123 and 1.063.84 Kopczuk (2005) concludes that “these results imply that an individual
84All of these elasticities are with respect to married filers only. Kopczuk excludes single filers, noting that
the results for singles are highly unstable, with the estimates of the direct elasticity and the interaction term
varying widely in subsamples and always insignificant.
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who has no access to any deductions would not respond to changes in the tax rates. The more
deductions are available, the stronger the response.”
Kopczuk (2005) also examines the robustness of previous estimates to changes in the esti-
mation method. He finds for a given specification that imposing different sample income floors
(based on those used in other published papers) generates a wide range of reasonable values;
excluding taxpayers with incomes below $10,000 (Gruber and Saez’s restriction) results in an
elasticity of 0.36; excluding those with tax rates below 22% ($21,020 for joint filers) yields an
elasticity of 0.82. Making no sample restrictions gives an elasticity of 2.3 and increasing the
restriction to $30,000 gives estimates of essentially zero. As we discussed in Section 3.4.2, this
lack of robustness to bottom trimming is probably due to the log-income specification com-
bined with the fact that many low-income earners experience very large percentage changes
in income over time.
Giertz (2007) applies the methods of Gruber and Saez (2002) to larger panel data sets
of tax returns from 1979 to 2001 available only within government agencies (see appendix
B.1). Using first the data from the Continuous Work History Survey (CWHS) which does
not oversample higher income earners, he shows that Gruber and Saez’s approach yields an
estimated elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the 1990s of 0.20 – or about half the size
of the corresponding estimate for the 1980s. However, when he uses broad income, instead
of taxable income, the estimated elasticity is 0.15, as opposed to 0.12 for the 1980s. This
significant difference between the taxable income estimates and small difference between the
broad income estimates is consistent with the results from Kopczuk (2005), suggesting that
the availability of deductions and exemptions matter in determining the ETI. Indeed, the
fraction of taxpayers choosing to itemize was approximately 25% lower at the time of OBRA
93 compared to TRA 86. Calculating the ETI for 1979 to 2001, Giertz obtains an estimate of
0.30.
Following Kopczuk (2005), Giertz includes separate and nonlinear controls for mean re-
version and divergence within the income distribution. This explains about one-third of the
difference between the 1980s and 1990s estimates, lowering the SOI-based 1980s estimate from
0.43 to 0.40 and raising the 1990s estimate to 0.26. Additionally, Kopczuk’s work implies that
changes to the tax base since 1986 could account for 14 to 29% of the remaining difference.
When Giertz (2007, 2008a) uses the full SOI data set, which oversamples high-income
earners, (see appendix B.1) to calculate the estimate for the 1990s tax changes, he finds (when
employing the same specification) estimates of 0.30 and 0.20 when he examines the years 1989
to 1995 and 1988 to 2001, respectively. The corresponding estimates for broad income are
0.20 and 0.13 (the first is strongly significant, whereas the second is not statistically different
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from zero). Giertz hypothesizes that the year choice affects estimates by altering the baseline
income trend. For example, if the income growth for upper-income filers (relative to lower-
income filers) moderated during those years, then the spline coefficients might be affected.
That could result in a flatter baseline income trend, which would result in lower estimated
responses. As we discussed in Section 3.4.2, having a set of controls for base-year income
eliminates bias in the estimation only if changes in mean reversion or income inequality are
stable over the time period studied.
Both Heim (2009) and Auten, Carroll and Gee (2008) examine the elasticity of taxable
income for the U.S. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA). Unfortunately
for identification purposes, the variation in the marginal tax rates for these two acts was much
lower than the tax acts in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors acknowledge this, and use state
as well as federal income tax variation to provide an additional source of identification.The
primary estimation method for both papers is based on the approach used in Gruber and Saez
(2002).85 In contrast to Gruber and Saez, Auten, Carroll and Gee include only a base-year
income control for mean reversion rather than a spline.86 Heim builds on Gruber and Saez
by adding controls for adjacent year income shifting. Auten, Carroll and Gee include control
variables very similar to Auten and Carroll (1999). Under their initial specification, they
estimate a statistically significant ETI of 0.39. In contrast to this, when employing a $50,000
cutoff (applying to the earlier year of each paired observation), Heim reports a statistically
insignificant ETI estimate of 0.22; however, this estimate is based on a model that includes
a 10-piece spline. When including those with incomes less than $50,000, Heim’s estimated
ETI increases to 0.32 and is now statistically significant. Heim’s results are fairly robust to
the inclusion of controls for adjacent year income shifting — i.e., income shifting that would
affect income in either year for each paired (or differenced) observation. When Auten, Carroll
and Gee compare income changes between end years 2000 and 2005, their ETI estimate rises
to 0.67. Their results are quite robust to the income cutoff, in contrast to what much of the
literature finds. For example, changing the income cutoff from $50,000 to $15,000 decreases
the estimated ETI to 0.16, but it remains positive and statistically significant, unlike similar
analyses in Kopczuk (2005). Heim also presents ETI estimates for various income groups by
85Both studies exclude capital gains from income measures and use SOI panel data sets for years 1999 to
2005 (see appendix B.1). The studies exclude some observations based on pre-reform income, age and other
demographic information. In general, Auten, Carroll and Gee are more restrictive in constructing their sample
than is Heim.
86As discussed earlier, specifications that include a 10-piece spline are likely to destroy identification, since
the percent change in MTRs was very similar for different points in the income distribution, nor was there much
time variation within the income distribution.
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interacting the tax rate variable with income group dummies. Heim reports substantial ETI
estimates for both tails of the income distribution and estimates that are close to zero in
between. For example, his estimated ETI for those with incomes under $10,000 is 0.32. For
those with incomes above $500,000 his estimated ETIs exceed 1.2.
Goolsbee (2000) also examines high-income responses to OBRA 93, but with a much dif-
ferent data set — panel data on executive compensation for the five highest-paid employees for
each firm in the Standard & Poor’s 500, Standard and Poor’s Mid Cap 400, and the Standard
and Poor’s Small Cap 600 from 1991 through 1995.87 In general, Goolsbee calculates large
responses to the current net-of-tax rate—estimated ETI’s are often well above one. Notably,
though, much of that response is a temporary shifting of income into the relatively low-tax
period. Longer-term elasticities are much smaller, often close to zero, but as high as 0.40.88
Among income sources, he finds that stock option exercises are the most responsive to tax
rates; when stock options are excluded, the short-run and long-run elasticities are almost the
same, and much lower (approximately 0.14). Hall and Liebman (2000) replicate the results of
Goolsbee (2000) with a similar data set that spans the 1980s, but only includes CEOs; they
do not find the same contrast between temporary and permanent responses to the tax cuts of
the 1980s. Their short-term elasticities are much smaller than Goolsbee’s — often modestly
negative, but not statistically different from zero — while their longer-term estimates are also
generally modest, ranging from 0.30 to 0.55 for TRA 86 and modestly negative for ERTA.89
As the discussion above suggests, the calculated ETI estimates for the 1990s, estimated
largely off of the 1990 and 1993 tax changes, are lower than those for the 1980s, estimated
largely off of the 1981 and 1986 changes. There are two broad, and not mutually exclusive,
categories of explanations. The first suggests there is no reason to expect a universal parameter
in the first place. Leading proponents of this hypothesis are Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), who
argue that the ETI is not a structural parameter and is a function of not only preferences, but
also the breadth of the tax base and tax enforcement parameters. Recall that Kopczuk (2005)
found empirical support for this hypothesis and that Giertz (2007) found that the elasticity
with respect to taxable income varies much more by decade than the elasticity with respect to
broad income, supporting the argument that changing rules for deductions affects the taxable
income elasticity.
The second category of explanations points to estimation issues as the driving reason
87The sample includes 21,299 observations for executives with at least four years of observations. If attrition
is non-random, and is more likely for those whose income falls, the estimates will be biased downwards because
tax rates are rising.
88The long-term elasticity is calculated as the sum of the current and future net-of-tax rate elasticities.
89The compositional analysis in Section 3.6, Figure 2 suggested indeed that the response of wage income to
TRA 86 had a temporary component, and also quite possibly a permanent component as well.
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behind the differences between decades. One such argument proposed by Carroll (1998) and
Giertz (2007), among others, suggests that (for at least some periods) the model is unable to
adequately control for exogenous income trends. As a result, the rising, and non-tax-related,
income inequality trend could bias ETI estimates upward when top tax rates fall and downward
when they rise. Gruber and Saez (2002), by showing that their 1980s estimates are robust to
including a linear time trend for each decile and year dummies, claim that exogenous income
trends do not affect the size of their estimates. However, these controls may not be complete.
The results of Kopczuk (2005) and Giertz (2007) suggest the sensitivity of ETI estimates to
how one controls for income trends, and show that this choice has different effects depending
on the decade, so that the same specification may not be able to control for exogenous income
trends in both periods. Another potential source of bias that varies across periods could arise
if the models fail to capture some potentially important types of income shifting, such as the
shifting between the corporate and individual income tax base. Incentives for this type of
shifting were greater in the 1980s than in the 1990s.
4.2 Un legislated variation in U.S. tax rates
Saez (2003) examines responses to tax increases resulting from bracket creep between 1979
and 1981 using the public-use version of the CWHS panel.90 During those years, inflation was
around 10% a year, but the tax brackets were fixed in nominal terms (that is, not indexed).
“Bracket creep” was a major issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so it is likely that
individuals were largely aware of its effects. Saez compares taxpayers with similar incomes
and thus the same tax rate in period one, but whose predicted incomes (that year’s income
grown at the inflation rate) put them into different brackets in a subsequent year.
He regresses the one-year change in the log of income against the instrumented log change in
the net-of-tax rate, along with base-year income controls and dummies for filing and itemization
status (for the specifications that group all taxpayers together).91 The discontinuities created
by “bracket creep” provide Saez with a unique opportunity to effectively control for mean
reversion and exogenous trends in income, because he can include taxable income in period
one as a control in the first stage (as well as the second), while maintaining a well-identified
system.
Saez finds a statistically insignificant overall ETI estimate of 0.31, which he decomposes
into values of 0.42 for itemizers and approximately 0 for non-itemizers. For AGI, the estimated
90He includes all single and married taxpayers in this study. He also excludes those whose marital status
changed. He includes all individuals that were in two simultaneous years (that is, he does not require individuals
to be in all three years of the study).
91He uses the instrument for tax rates first used by Auten and Carroll (1999).
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overall ETI is 0.18 and insignificant, but when itemizers are considered separately, the estimate
rises to 0.34 and is significant. This suggests that itemizers are more responsive, both in their
itemization decisions, and in the amount of income they report. Estimated elasticities for wage
income are much smaller, and never significantly different from zero.
In principle this study addresses both mean reversion and exogenous income trends issues
as control and treatment groups are evenly distributed along the tax schedule. Reassuringly,
the results are actually fairly close to tax-change-based results: the elasticity of wage income
is about zero, the broad income elasticity is positive but small in most specification, while
the taxable income elasticity is around 0.4 and statistically significant. This study, however,
captures only short-term (or transitory) responses to the tax rate changes. As a result, the
elasticity estimated is a Frisch elasticity which is theoretically larger than the elasticity to a
permanent tax change which is of most interest to policy makers. Furthermore, responding to
bracket creep requires that tax filers know the locations of tax brackets and are able to fine-
tune their incomes and deductions accordingly. As a result, the positive elasticities obtained
using bracket creep are inconsistent with the complete lack of bunching around the kink points
of the regular federal income tax schedule documented in Saez (2009).
Looney and Singhal (2006) examine changes in marginal tax rates resulting from the loss of
a dependent tax deduction or exemption to estimate elasticities for middle-income families.92
Looney and Singhal’s primary data source is the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP)93 (for years 1990 to 1996), but they also use the public-use version of the CWHS panel94
(for years 1987 to 1990) to see whether the results they found are robust to another, more
commonly used, data set. Their identification strategy is based on comparing the behavior
of those experiencing a change in rates (due to a change in their number of dependents) to
similarly situated families who also experience a change in their number of dependents, but do
not experience a change in tax rates.95 Looney and Singhal report a statistically significant
estimated elasticity of 0.75 with the SIPP data, and a wage income elasticity of 0.71 with
the tax data, although this estimate is not statistically significant. As discussed earlier, such
large elasticities are inconsistent with the absence of bunching around the kink points of the
federal income tax. Note also that Looney and Singhal estimate a response to a temporary
tax change (as the marginal tax rate difference between control and treatment groups applies
92Initial-period income ranges from $35,000 to $85,000.
93They only use married taxpayers with dependents. To be included, dependents must reside with the
taxpayer for at least one year that is covered by this panel. Also, those with changes to marital status are
excluded.
94The exclusions are the same as for the SIPP, with several minor additional exclusions.
95For the time period under examination, losing a dependent exemption could shift a family from the 15% to
the 28% tax bracket.
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only to the following year). As a result, their elasticity estimate is a Frisch elasticity which is
theoretically larger than the elasticity to a permanent tax change.
Finally, Saez (2009) develops a method to estimate the compensated elasticity of reported
income with respect to the net-of-tax rate using bunching evidence around the kink points of
the federal U.S. income tax schedule. In the standard model, the amount of bunching should
be proportional to the elasticity and the net-of-tax rate (log) change at the kink. Saez (2009)
finds clear evidence of bunching around the first kink point of the Earned Income Tax Credit96
with an implied estimated intensive earnings elasticity of around 0.25, but this elasticity is
driven entirely by the self-employed with no elasticity for wage earners, and hence could be
due entirely to tax manipulation rather than actual labor supply responses. Saez (2009) also
finds evidence of bunching at the threshold of the first tax bracket where tax liability starts,
especially in the 1960s when the tax schedule was stable and simple. However, there is no
evidence of bunching at all for other kink points of the tax schedule, even when the tax
brackets are stable over many years and where jumps in marginal tax rates are substantial.
This suggests that simplicity and saliency are critical to observe bunching at kink points as
the standard model predicts, and that tax filers are unlikely to respond at all to small and
non-salient changes in incentives.
4.3 Empirical Analysis of Legislated Tax Changes in Other Countries
While the bulk of the research on the ETI has been based on U.S. tax return data, some studies
have addressed Canada and certain European countries. In the years following TRA 86 in the
United States, many of these countries underwent similar major tax reforms that involved a
broadening of the tax base along with substantial cuts in marginal tax rates. Note, though, that
because the ETI will depend on many aspects of a country’s tax system, including the tax base
definition, avoidance opportunities, and the enforcement regime, there is no reason to expect
the ETI will be the same across countries, even if preferences–including the substitutability
between leisure and goods–were the same everywhere.
4.3.1 United Kingdom
The United Kingdom experienced a dramatic drop in the marginal income tax rate at the top
during the Thatcher administration. Indeed, the top MTR on earnings fell from 83% to 60%
in 1979, and then dropped further to 40% in 1988.
Dilnot and Kell (1988) first analyzed the 1979 top rate cut. They note that the share
of tax receipts from the top 1% of taxpayers stayed constant from 1978 to 1985 in spite of
96The EITC is based on earnings with a phase-in, plateau, and phase-out ranges, which create large kinks in
the budget sets of low income families with children.
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the tax rate cut, which implies that top incomes must have increased following the tax cut.
Dilnot and Kell do not estimate elasticities but quantify the expected changes in tax receipts
assuming no behavioral responses and controlling for macro-economic conditions (as in Lindsey
1987). More recently, Blow and Preston (2002) have used micro tax data for 1985 and 1995
to analyze responses to tax rates, but they focus exclusively on the self-employed, and do not
look specifically at top incomes.
Brewer et al. (2008) carry out a top income share time series analysis from 1962 to 2003.
They show that the top 1% income share was falling in the United Kingdom until 1978, and
started increasing precisely in 1979. The top 1% share doubled from 6% in 1978 to 12.6% in
2003, while over the same period the net-of-tax rate also doubled from 21% to 47%, implying
an elasticity of 0.9. Time-series-based regressions of the log top 1% income share on the log
net-of-tax rate produces significant elasticities around 0.5, even when controlling for changes
in inequality using the share of income accruing to the next 4% (which did not experience
significant changes in marginal tax rates over the period). They also show that the fraction of
foreigners at the top of the U.K. distribution has increased much more quickly than the fraction
of foreigners in middle or upper groups. Differential tax rates across European countries might
generate migration, which is a potential source of behavioral response contributing to the ETI
in particular countries. The migration effects of taxes are potentially important but have
been understudied, primarily because of lack of citizenship or country of birth information in
administrative individual tax data.
4.3.2 Denmark
Kleven and Schultz (2009) use panel tax return data since 1980 to analyze behavioral responses
to various income tax reforms over the period 1984 to 2005 in Denmark using a method similar
to Gruber and Saez (2002). Their study has three key advantages relative to U.S.-based studies.
First, they can use the full universe of Danish tax filers over a long period, generating a very
large longitudinal dataset which also contains detailed socio-economic information. Second,
the Danish income distribution has been very stable over this period compared to the U.S.
distribution, making tax effects much easier to identify. Third, the Danish tax reforms of
the period 1984-2005 generated substantial tax variation that is not systematically correlated
with income, as different reforms affected different brackets and consisted of both rate increases
and decreases for a given bracket. Furthermore, many changes apply only to specific income
components as the Danish tax system imposes different rates on different components. As a
result, they can control for a rich set of base-year incomes. They find that (1) population-wide
elasticities are modest compared to most existing studies, (2) elasticities for capital income are
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larger than for labor income, (3) elasticities for negative income (deductions, negative capital
income) are larger than for positive income, (4) elasticities for the self-employed are larger than
for employees, (5) elasticities are monotonically increasing in income level and are 2 to 3 times
larger in the top quintile of the distribution than in the bottom quintile of the distribution,
and (6) income effects are very small.
Chetty et al. (2009) also use population tax files from Denmark and estimate the ETI
using bunching evidence around kink points, building upon the method developed in Saez
(2009) in the U.S. case. They develop a new method of estimating the long-run elasticity in an
environment where adjustment costs attenuate short-run behavioral responses by comparing
the short-run effects of small vs. large tax changes. Consistent with the existence of large
adjustment costs, the amount of bunching they obtain is a highly convex function of the size
of the change in the net-of-tax rate at the kink. Interestingly, they find that much of the
bunching at kink points is driven by collective bargaining agreements by unions, who facilitate
coordination and effectively reduce adjustment costs. The degree of bunching varies across
demographic groups and occupations in a manner that appears to be correlated with the
flexibility of labor supply and is much more pronounced for secondary earners and especially
the self-employed. Their results suggest that adjustment frictions create heterogeneity in the
size of the elasticity response in the short-run and that such effects need to be taken into
account to obtain the long-run elasticity that is often of interest for policy making.
4.3.3 Canada
The 1988 Canadian tax reform raised statutory marginal tax rates for the two lowest-income
groups, and lowered them for those falling into the top nine brackets. It also broadened the
tax base by either eliminating many deductions and exemptions or converting them to non-
refundable tax credits, and raised the fraction of capital gains (or losses) included in taxable
income from one-half to two-thirds. Canadian provincial income tax rates are generally a
proportion of federal rates, thus magnifying the federal changes.
In examining behavioral responses to the Canadian reform, Sillamaa and Veall (2001) use
a panel of taxpayers who filed in both 1986 and 1989.97 Marginal tax rate calculations include
both federal and provincial income taxes. Sillamaa and Veall employ a method similar to
Auten and Carroll (1999), differencing variables for the two years and instrumenting for the
97Their data are from the Longitudinal and Administrative Data Base (LAD), which includes information
that respondents provide on their Canadian tax returns. They exclude taxpayers with low incomes (roughly
under $9000 for singles, $13,000 for married individuals), those who moved from one province to another, and
Quebec residents. Their measure of taxable income includes actual dividend income (rather than adjusted
dividend income) and excludes capital gains. Further, they split the sample, analyzing ages 25 to 61, and over
64, separately. Other age groups are excluded.
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net-of-tax rate. As control variables they use log of 1986 income, the log of 1986 capital income
(i.e., interest plus dividends), age and age squared in 1986, dummies for self-employment and
marital status, and number of children.
They estimate an ETI of 0.14 for those ages 25 to 61 and 0.27 for those over age 64.98 Their
corresponding estimates for AGI99 are 0.25 and 0.29, respectively. Interestingly, their gross
income elasticity estimates are higher than their taxable income elasticity estimates, in contrast
to the usual finding based on U.S. data, possibly related to the fact that deductions in Canada
are much more limited than in the United States. Similar to many of the U.S. studies, they
report much larger elasticities for upper income groups. Strikingly, the estimated elasticity
for self-employment income is 1.32, but is just 0.08 for regular employment (i.e., non-self-
employment) income. Given that 1989 was the first year that the new tax rate system was
in place, one concern is that their elasticity estimates might capture the short-term response
while overstating the long-run response to the tax change. As discussed earlier, using only two
years of data makes it impossible to control adequately for mean reversion or income inequality
changes.
Saez and Veall (2005) use aggregated-time-series income-share methods to analyze the
effect of taxation on top income shares in Canada.100 They first show that the trends in
income shares were quite similar for the United States and Canada, and that in the long
run the Canadian trends track U.S. trends more closely than they track Canadian tax rate
changes, although there were clear short-run responses to changes in the marginal tax rates.
Additionally, like the U.S., a significant portion of the increase was due to wages and salary
growth.
They go on to argue that, for Canada, one must consider the possibility of a “brain drain”
where high-income individuals move to the U.S. if after-tax compensation was more attractive
there. They regress the log income share against the log net-of-tax rate for both the top 1%
and top 0.1% of taxpayers, yielding elasticity estimates of 0.83 and 0.96, respectively.101 When
they also include a control for the income share of the top 1% (or 0.1)% of taxpayers in the
U.S., the elasticities drop to 0.48 and 0.30.
Examining wage income shares, the elasticity falls from 2.55 to being not statistically
98These are with respect to their measure of taxable income, which is constant-law with respect to 1989.
99This measure is reported income, adjusted in the following ways: actual dividend income is substituted for
adjusted dividend income, refundable tax credits and nontaxable transfers are included, and capital gains are
excluded.
100Their estimates are from personal income tax return statistics compiled annually by the Canadian federal
taxation authorities since 1920. They exclude capital gains, and only examine the top decile of the income
distribution.
101The net-of-tax rate is the average (income-weighted) marginal tax rate applicable to the top 1% group in
Canada.
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different from zero when the U.S. income control is included. This lends additional credence
to their brain-drain hypothesis by suggesting that the rise in Canadian wages can be attributed
to a rise of incomes in the U.S., and not to changes in Canadian marginal tax rates. It also
implies that some rise in real incomes (not just tax avoidance measures) took place in the U.S.;
otherwise, there would have been no incentive for Canadians to move to the U.S. in seek of
higher compensation. Arguably, though, the U.S. share variable is proxying for a trend toward
inequality in all developed countries.
4.3.4 Germany
Germany’s 1990 tax reform (passed in mid-1988) reduced marginal tax rates throughout the
income distribution, with by far the largest decreases for those in the middle of the distribution,
while at the same time changing the tax base, with some allowances eliminated and others
expanded.
Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004) estimate taxable income responses to the German tax
reform using data from a tax return panel102 for the years 1988 to 1991, although they focus
on 1988 and 1990. They base their taxable income measure on the 1990 definition and impute
1990 marginal tax rates by inflating 1988 income to 1990 and running this measure through a
tax calculator (as done by Auten and Carroll (1999)).
Gottfried and Schellhorn follow the approach used by Gruber and Saez (2002), but use
only one pair of years, 1988 and 1990. Unlike Gruber and Saez, their regressions are not
income-weighted and they consider as an alternative a median regression framework that puts
less weight on outliers. For the full model, they report a compensated ETI estimate of 0.58 and
an income elasticity of zero.103 The compensated ETI estimate is most directly comparable
to Gruber and Saez’s estimate for the U.S. of 0.61. However, as discussed earlier, using only
two years makes it impossible to control adequately for mean reversion or income inequality
changes without compromising identification.
4.3.5 Sweden
The Swedish tax reform of 1991 cut the federal income tax rate structure from one with five
tax brackets, with marginal rates reaching 42% in 1989, to one with just one bracket of 20%.
Additionally, the tax rates on capital income were set at a flat rate of 30%, whereas before
102The data is from Institute fu¨r Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, IAW. They excluded individuals that
chose to retire, changed marital status, received unemployment or sick benefits, or had a taxable income of less
than 10,000 DM.
103It is noteworthy that, without the log of 1988 income in the model to control for mean reversion, the
estimated ETI is approximately zero.
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they were taxed under the same graduated rate structure as earned income. In addition, Swe-
den substantially cut back on deductions and exclusions and reformed its transfer policies.104
Estimating behavioral responses to the Swedish reform is complicated by the fact that the
timing of the reform coincided with a sharp recession and modified drastically the tax base
making it difficult to construct the same income concepts before and after the reform.
Sele´n (2002) and Hansson (2007) both estimate taxable income responses to Sweden’s 1991
tax reform, relying on different data sets and employing somewhat different methodologies.
Sele´n studies a stratified sample (Statistic Sweden’s household income survey, HINK) that
includes demographic information and is linked to administrative tax and social insurance
records. Hansson uses data (Longitudinell individdatabas, LINDA) on a random sample of
Swedes that includes income, wealth, and tax information, as well as other census and demo-
graphic variables.Both studies, though, focus on prime-age individuals appearing in the data
in both 1989 and 1992.105 While using different sets of control variables, both studies employ
difference-in-differences methodologies based on those used by Feldstein (1995), and Moffitt
and Wilhelm (2000). Additionally, Sele´n produces estimates employing a number of variations
of the approach used by Gruber and Saez (2002), while Hansson also utilizes a similar ap-
proach, but relies on just one pair of years. As discussed earlier, using only two years makes
it impossible to control adequately for mean reversion or income inequality changes, casting
doubt on the robustness of those results.
When Sele´n allows for an income effect and includes the log of base year income among his
control variables, he reports estimated ETIs that are generally between 0.2 and 0.4. Among
components of taxable income, wage and salary income generally has the smallest estimated
elasticity (often less than 0.2) and factor income has the largest (generally above 0.3). When
focusing on those in the top two tax brackets (who also work 200 or more hours per year), Sele´n
reports an estimated ETI of 0.53. When allowing for an income effect, he finds an estimated
(compensated) ETI of 0.41 and an income effect of 0.27. The significance of the income effect
and the effect of its inclusion on the ETI estimate runs contrary to Gruber and Saez’s results
for the U.S. during the 1980s.
Hansson reports several ETI estimates for Sweden that range from 0.37 to 0.43. She then
conducts a range of sensitivity analyses. One approach attempts to control for mean reversion
by including as control variables, such as dummies for students and welfare recipients. This
results in slightly smaller estimated ETIs, ranging from 0.36 to 0.39.
104See Ljunge and Ragan (2005) for details. Swedes also pay municipal taxes with marginal rates that averaged
30%; these rates did not change much in 1991.
105Sele´n focuses only on males, while Hansson examines the behavior of both males and females. Sweden, like
many countries, has individual-based income tax filing and, pre-reform, very few women were in the upper tax
brackets.
54
Holmlund and Soderstrom (2008) use panel data from 1991-2002 to study two recent income
tax reforms in Sweden: the top rate increased by 5 percentage points in 1995 and the top
bracket was split into two brackets with a bottom rate lower by 5 percentage points. They
adopt the stacked panel approach. As mentioned above, an important innovation they propose
is to distinguish between short-term and long-term responses by including a lagged change in
marginal tax rate in their panel specification. They obtain significant long-term elasticities
between 0.1 and 0.3 for men and insignificant and very close to zero elasticities for women.
Blomquist and Selin (2009) use earlier Swedish tax reforms in the 1980s and combine tax
return data with survey data in order to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate with
respect to the net-of-tax rate. They use longitudinal data for 1981 and 1991. The standard
labor supply literature assumes that the pre-tax hourly wage rate is exogenous but, as the ETI
literature points out, tax rates could also affect, among other things, occupational choices and
hence the pre-tax wage rate. They find a statistically significant response both for married
men and married women. The hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate
is estimated to be 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 for females. Notably, they also estimate
significant income effects. The main drawbacks of the analysis are the small sample size—the
sample with survey data that includes hours of work is small—and the use of only two years of
data. Marginal tax rate changes are instrumented with predicted changes in net-of-tax rates
based on income from a middle year 1986. This method is related in spirit to Carroll (1998)
who used as instruments the predicted changes in net-of-tax rates based on average pre- and
post-reform income (see Section 3.4.2).
4.3.6 Norway
Prior to 1992, top marginal tax rates in Norway neared 58% for employees and 63% for the
self-employed, while the top rate on capital income exceeded 40%. A major reform in 1992
lowered rates, especially for high-income groups, and broadened the tax base, dropping the
marginal income tax rates for labor, capital, dividend and corporate income to 28%. Labor
income, however, was also made subject to taxes for social insurance and to a surtax on
incomes above a threshold. For high earners subject to the surtax, the difference in tax rates
on capital and labor income widened substantially. A potential obstacle to identification of
taxable income elasticities is that Norway underwent an economic recovery shortly after the tax
reform (although likely not resulting from the reform), which may have had a heterogeneous
impact across income groups.
Aarbu and Thoreson (2001) use a panel of more than 2000 individuals for years 1991 and
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1994 to estimate taxable income106 responses to the Norwegian reform. Their data includes
detailed information on income and taxes, plus some demographic and social security infor-
mation.107 They pursue both a regression-based tabulated differences approach developed by
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), and one based on Auten and Carroll (1999). In addition to the
instrumented log of the net-of-tax rate,108 they include macroeconomic variables in their mod-
els to account for business cycle effects. Like Hansson (2007), they also construct a variable
measuring the gap between capital and labor tax rates in order to control for income shifting.
They include dummy variables for life cycle (a dummy variable for unmarried persons under
the age of 28), marital status, education, area, and children’s age, as well as a variable for
age. Using the Auten and Carroll-based approach, the full model produces an estimated ETI
of -0.03 (and not statistically different from 0), decidedly lower than similar estimates in the
U.S.
4.3.7 New Zealand
Atkinson and Leigh (2008) analyze the top 1% income share in New Zealand from 1921 to
2005.109 Similar to studies examining Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), U.S. (Saez, 2004), and
Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 2007), they find large growth in the top 1% of income shares
over the 1980s and 1990s. Like Saez and Veall’s (2005) analysis of Canada, they consider two
main stories for the changes in top income shares: changes in top marginal income tax rates
in New Zealand, and changes in the “threat of emigration” as captured by changes in top
income shares in Australia and the U.K.110 To estimate the behavioral response to tax rates,
they regress the top 1% income share on a quadratic time trend and one year lags of the net-
of-tax rate for top-bracket individuals, the Australian and U.K. top 1% income share, and the
growth rate in real GDP. When including all these controls simultaneously, they estimate the
coefficient on the net-of-tax rate to be 0.06 and statistically significant; this corresponds to an
elasticity of 0.41 when calculated at 2005 tax year values. The coefficients on the top income
shares of Australia and the United Kingdom are 0.32 and 0.28, respectively,111 which they
interpret as suggesting that the threat of emigration has had a larger effect on high-income
106Their taxable income measure includes both labor and capital income and is constant-law 1994.
107For their sample, they include only those ages 22 to 65 in 1994 with positive incomes, whose marital status
and number of children remain the same. Their sample size is 2,246.
108The instrument is calculated using the same methodology as Auten and Carroll (1999), except they use the
growth in nominal wage income to inflate 1991 income.
109They use tax return and national accounts data to construct the top income shares. After 1953, they
include all individuals over age 15 (before 1953, they exclude married women, since the taxpaying unit at that
time was a household, rather than an individual).
110The authors note that emigration to Australia and the U.K. account for almost 75% of total emigration
from New Zealand.
111The former is statistically significant at the 5% level, the latter is not.
56
shares than the change in New Zealand’s marginal tax rates.
4.3.8 Other Countries
France: Piketty (1999) uses repeated cross sections of French tax data to show that small
changes in French top tax rates generated small short-term responses for top incomes, but
that those responses do not seem to persist over time.
Finland: Pirtilla and Selin (2006) analyze the Finnish tax reform of 1993 which sharply reduced
the marginal tax rates on capital income for some, but not all, taxpayers, but did not change
simultaneously the taxation of labor income. They use panel tax data for two years, 1992 and
1995. They find that the reform led to a small positive impact on overall taxable income, but
that part of the positive response was probably offset by income shifting from labor to capital
income among the self-employed in order to take advantage of the lower rates. Janti et al.
(2009) construct top income shares in Finland and argue that the 1993 tax reform had an
impact on the level and composition of top incomes. They document a surge in dividends and
self-employment income just after the 1993 reform as those income sources received preferential
tax treatment following the institution of a dual income tax.
Poland: Kopczuk (2009) analyzes the impact of the 2004 tax reform in Poland which intro-
duced an optional broad-based low-rate tax for business income. The analysis relies on a large
panel of tax return data and uses a difference-in-difference strategy relying on the differential
benefits from the reform among otherwise similar individuals due to the level of earnings of the
spouse and pre-existing deductions. The identification strategy is innovative as this low rate
optional flat-rate applies only to business income and is favorable only upon certain conditions.
As a result, it generates compelling instruments and shows that such business income is quite
responsive to taxation.
Russia: Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova (2009) examine the effects of
Russia’s 2001 flat rate income tax reform on consumption, income, and tax evasion using the
gap between household expenditures and reported earnings as a proxy for tax evasion. They
use household panel data for 1998-2004 and a difference-in-difference strategy as different
income groups were affected differently. They find a significant effect of the tax rate reduction
on reported income but not on consumption, suggesting that most of the response was the
consequence of tax evasion. Building on Chetty’s (2008) framework, they show that the
efficiency gains from the reform are substantially smaller than the gains estimated from the
conventional approach using solely the ETI. This analysis is based on a relatively small sample
and does not capture well changes at the top of the distribution where changes were most
dramatic. Therefore, it would certainly be valuable to evaluate more systematically the flat-
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tax reforms that many of the former communist countries have adopted over the last 10-15
years using tax return based evidence.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 What we’ve learned
As Feldstein (1995) first asserted, under certain assumptions all behavioral responses to income
tax rate changes are symptoms of inefficiency, and all such responses are captured by the
elasticity of taxable income. Because of the centrality of this parameter to the marginal
efficiency cost of raising revenue though tax rate increases and therefore to the evaluation of
tax structure, and because of the growing availability of longitudinal tax return data, a large
empirical literature followed. The early literature, focusing on the U.S. tax cuts of 1981 and
particularly 1986, produced elasticity estimates large enough to suggest that, not only was the
marginal efficiency cost of tax rates high, but that the U.S. might be on the wrong side of the
Laffer curve.
Subsequent research generated considerably lower estimates, in part because of better
data and improved methodology, but also because the variety of tax rate changes after 1986
facilitated separating out the impact of tax rate changes from non-tax-related changes in the
inequality of pre-tax income. The most reliable longer-run estimates range from 0.12 to 0.4,
suggesting that the U.S. marginal top rate is far from the top of the Laffer curve, but greater
than one would calculate if the sole behavioral response was labor supply. Estimates for other
countries are, for the most part, in this same range.
There is much evidence to suggest that the ETI is higher for high-income individuals who
have more access to avoidance opportunities, including deductible expenses. This finding
highlights the importance of the fact that the ETI is not an immutable parameter, but can
be influenced by government policies regarding, for example, the broadness and extent of
enforcement of the tax base. For this reason it is likely to vary across countries and within
countries over time when non-rate aspects of tax systems change.
One attraction of the ETI concept–that it is a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis and
therefore one need not inquire into the anatomy of behavioral response—has proven to be
overstated. The welfare relevance of the elasticity depends on the extent of fiscal externalities
– whether taxable income is shifted to or from another tax base, or to and from the same tax
base at a different time. Moreover, if classical externalities apply to often-deductible items
such as charitable contributions, the ETI must be adjusted for welfare purposes. Examining
which components of taxable income respond to tax rates (the “anatomy” of response) can
help clarify the extent of these externalities. This brings us back to the pre-ETI attention to
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each of the many margins of behavioral response to tax rate changes.
Nevertheless, the essential insight underlying the ETI remains valid: that income tax
rates cause taxpayers to respond on a wide range of margins and, under some conditions, all
of these responses reflect inefficiency, because they would not have been undertaken absent
the tax rates. This is especially true of high-income, financially savvy taxpayers who in
most countries have access to sophisticated tax avoidance techniques. There is clear evidence
of responses that would fall in the first two tiers of the Slemrod (1995) hierarchy—timing,
shifting, avoidance—based on U.S. evidence since 1980, but only at the top end of the income
distribution. Given this finding, it is especially critical to understand the mechanisms and
efficiency consequences of any given tax change—legal structure, taxpayer information, and so
on.
The empirical methods are most convincing in estimating the short-term response to tax
rate changes, and in that case one must be careful to distinguish the response to antici-
pated versus unanticipated changes. Estimates of the long-run elasticity of taxable income are
plagued by extremely difficult issues of identification, so difficult that we believe that there
are no convincing estimates of the long-run elasticity of reported taxable income to changes in
the marginal tax rate. Analysis of panel data does not seem likely to resolve the identification
issues raised by trends in income inequality and mean reversion at the top and bottom ends
of the income distribution. Repeated cross-section analysis based on longer time series is very
useful to analyze changes in the share of income accruing to various income groups and assess
whether those changes are systematically related to changes in marginal tax rates. However,
evidence from a single country is in general not enough to conclusively estimate behavioral
elasticities as many factors besides tax rate shape the income distribution. Time-series share
analysis, coupled with compositional analysis, is extremely useful to detect large short-term
changes due to behavioral responses.
5.2 What we need to learn
First, future research that attempts to quantify the welfare cost of higher tax rates should
attempt to measure the components of behavioral responses as well as their sum. It needs
to be more attentive to the extent to which the behavioral response reflects shifting to other
bases.
Second, empirical analyzes should look more systematically at non-U.S. experience in order
to potentially validate the conclusions based on U.S. experience and to sharpen our under-
standing of how the environment, writ large, affects the ETI. As discussed above, this line of
research is already underway and indeed the most promising and innovative recent studies on
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the ETI have been based on non-US data. Part of the reason is that several OECD countries,
especially in Scandinavia, are now substantially in advance of the United States in terms of
tax data availability for research. This trend is likely to continue unless the United States
broadens access to population tax return data.
Third, researchers should be seeking better sources of identification; for example, parallel
income tax systems that differentially affect taxpayers over a long period of time. Conceivably,
field experiments could be designed where individuals are randomly assigned to different tax
schedules in the spirit of the older Negative Income Tax experiments in the United States
(Munnell, 1987).
Finally, research needs to be sensitive to the possibility that non-standard aspects of tax
systems and the behavioral response to them such as salience, information, popular support,
asymmetric response to increases versus decreases, might affect the size of behavioral response.
The recent approach of Chetty (2009) is particularly promising. His meta-analysis, which
includes most ETI studies, shows that the discrepancies across estimates could be explained
by imperfect optimization and frictions such as adjustment costs. In that context, large and
salient changes in tax rates provide much more informative estimates of the long-run ETI than
small or non-salient changes.
5.3 The tax base elasticity
Although the literature reviewed in this article addresses the behavioral response to income
taxation, many of the issues apply to any tax base. Certainly the idea that, under some
assumptions, all responses are symptoms of inefficiency applies generally. For example, from
the perspective of states imposing cigarette excise taxes, under some assumptions the central
empirical parameter is the elasticity of the tax base, which includes not only the response of
smoking to tax rate changes but also the impact on the tax base of smuggling and tax-free
Internet purchases. This generalization is, of course, subject to the same caveats this article
has focused on, such as shifting across bases.
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A Recent legislated tax changes in the United States
In this appendix section, we briefly outline the major changes in the U.S. individual income
tax since the mid 1950s. Table A1 reports the top statutory marginal federal income tax rates
on (1) ordinary individual income, (2) earned income, (3) long-term realized capital gains, as
well as the corporate tax rate since 1952. The table also describes briefly the most important
additional provisions affecting high-income tax rates.
Although Congress regularly amends the tax code, only occasionally does it make major
reforms. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code represented an important and fundamental reform to
the U.S. tax system. The 1954 Code created 24 tax brackets with marginal tax rates increasing
with income from 20 to 91%, but with a maximum tax rate of 25% applied to capital gains; the
top corporate tax rate was 52%. (While the 1954 act represented a fundamental change to the
U.S. tax system, it did not alter MTRs on top incomes.) The 1954 Code was amended many
times, but remained in place until 1986. The 1960s saw a couple of important tax changes.
One was the Revenue Act of 1964, inspired by President John Kennedy, but enacted under
President Lyndon Johnson. This act reduced individual and corporate tax rates, notably
lowering the top marginal income tax rate from 91% to 70%. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
introduced a new rate schedule. While the top individual income tax rate remained at 70%,
the top rate on earned income was lowered (over the next few years) to 50%.112 The 1970s saw
federal tax revenues (and effective marginal tax rates) increase as a result of “bracket creep”
brought on by the combination of unusually high inflation and tax brackets not indexed for
inflation. In response to this, a series of tax acts were passed, most of which lowered tax
revenues by increasing allowable tax deductions and credits.
Congress has changed federal marginal tax rates several times since 1980. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) reduced the top rate from 70% to 50%, and lowered all
other tax rates in three annual steps by a total of about 23% (not 23 percentage points). TRA
86 represented the most comprehensive tax reform since 1954. It dropped the top marginal
tax rate to 28% in two steps from 1986 to 1988, and made smaller cuts across the income
distribution. TRA 86 also eliminated the exclusion of 60% of long-term capital gains, lowered
the corporate tax rate from 46% to 34%, and contained scores of other provisions several of
which reduced deductions.
The tax changes of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA 90
and OBRA 93) were smaller and more focused on high-income filers than those of the 1980s.
OBRA 90 increased the top tax rate from 28 to 31%. OBRA 93 further increased the top rate
112The 1969 Act also extended a 5% income tax surcharge. Additionally, it established both the individual
and corporate Alternative Minimum Tax.
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from 31 to 36% and applied this rate to individuals with lower incomes. It also created a new
top marginal tax rate of 39.6% by legislating a 10% surtax. (Top tax rates on earned income
increased by roughly another 2.9 percentage points because the cap on income subject to the
Medicare portion of the payroll tax was lifted.) Unlike TRA 86, OBRA 90 incorporated only
a few changes to the tax code and there were no additional changes made when OBRA 93
was passed. OBRA 93 is the first U.S. legislated tax act clearly qualifies as an anticipated
change—Clinton announced his intention of passing this act in 1992.113 Also in the 1990s, the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 substantially lowered capital gains tax rates, among other things.
This Act did not change tax rates on earned income other than capital gains.
Tax rates have also changed since 2000. In 2001, the Economic Growth Tax Relief and
Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) lowered marginal tax rates, reduced the number of tax brackets
and expanded allowable credits and deductions. Different aspects of EGTRRA were scheduled
to phase in over a number of years, with the act expiring completely in 2011. In 2003, the
Jobs Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) accelerated all of the marginal rate
cuts from EGTRRA that were not set to fully phase-in until 2006. Additionally, JGTRRA
substantially lowered tax rates on capital gains and dividends down to 15%. Like EGTRRA,
these changes will expire in 2011, absent action by Congress.
Before proceeding, note that, as a practical matter, a number of studies in the empirical
literature (as well the empirical exercise in Section 3) examine adjusted gross income (AGI) in
place of taxable income. Taxable income equals AGI minus the value of personal exemptions
and either the standard or itemized deductions. Many data sets do not include enough infor-
mation to calculate taxable income in a consistent way over many years. This is especially
true for data sets spanning many decades, over which the definition of taxable income changes
substantially. Creating a constant-law income measure (see the previous section) often requires
information that is not reported, and therefore not available to researchers, in many years.
Many taxable income responses are also captured in AGI; however, changes in itemized deduc-
tions are not observed. Also, recall from Section 2 that the potential for positive externalities
associated with some itemized deductions could argue for examining responses to AGI — even
when good measures of taxable income are available.
B Tax Return Data
As discussed in the paper, the estimation of behavioral responses of reported income to tax
changes relies critically on the availability of high quality individual income tax data. In this
113Romer and Romer (2008) examine the motivation for tax changes since WWII, which is important to assess
the endogeneity of tax changes and their implications for identification.
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appendix section, we discuss briefly data availability in the United States and we describe in
more detail the data we used in Section 3.4.
B.1 U.S. Tax Return Data
The Statistics of Income (SOI) division at the Internal Revenue Service has created large
annual micro-datasets of individual tax returns since 1960. The SOI data are stratified random
samples of about 250,000 tax returns and include most of the information reported on the filers’
tax returns, plus some additional demographic information. Sampling rates vary by income
(and other tax return characteristics). The SOI heavily over samples high-income filers with
100% sampling rates at the top of the distribution, a key advantage as top incomes play a
critical role in determining overall responses to changes in tax rates.
Sampling into the SOI data is based on (a random transformation of) Social Security
numbers of tax filers. These assigned numbers do not change from year to year, and beginning
with year 1979, enable researchers to link SOI annual cross-sections into a panel dataset. (For
more detail on the SOI data and the SOI’s sampling strategy, see the discussion below on the
data used in section 3.) In particular, a core set of five last 4 digits of the Social Security
numbers are always sampled and hence are a pure longitudinal sample of 0.05% of US tax
returns. This core longitudinal sample within the SOI data is called the Continuous Work
History Sample (CWHS).
In several cases, SOI has supplemented the core SOI cross sections by creating additional
panel data drawing from the full population of individual tax returns. One such example is
the Treasury’s Family Panel, which is a stratified random sample of tax filers followed from
1987 to 1996. The Family Panel begins with 88,000 tax returns in 1987, follows filers and their
dependents through 1996 and includes “refreshments” in order to remain representative of
the overall filing population. Treasury’s 1999 Edited Panel, which begins in 1999, is designed
similarly to the Family Panel. It currently runs through 2005. Another example is the Sales
of Capital Assets Panel (SOCA), which follows a sample of tax filers reporting sales of capital
assets (on Schedule D of IRS Form 1040).
SOI has released to the public the so-called “Public Use File” (PUF) version of the SOI
annual cross-sections. In order to protect the identity of taxpayers, those public use files have
a lower sampling rate at the very top (1/3 instead of 1) and they also blur some variables for
very high incomes by combining several tax returns together. The PUF contain about 100,000
tax returns per year. However, the PUF do not contain longitudinal identifiers and hence
cannot be linked into panel data. Another important limitation of the PUF is that they do
not report separately income items of each spouse in the case of married joint filers, limiting
63
our ability to measure the important secondary earner response to tax changes.114
A public-use version of the CWHS was also made public for years 1979 to 1990. The
public version of the panel also included some “blurring” of information in order to protect the
identity of taxpayers. The public-use version of the CWHS goes by various names, including the
“University of Michigan Tax Panel” or “NBER Tax Panel.” The absence of publicly available
U.S. panel data since 1990 has severely limited the ability of academic researchers to study more
recent tax changes. As a result, most of the recent studies have been carried out by researchers
within government agencies (in a few cases in collaboration with outside academics).
Due to improvements in information technology, it has now become feasible for SOI to use
the complete population files of tax returns, i.e., about 140 million tax returns each year. Those
samples can of course be linked longitudinally. The extremely large size of the population files
could be used to broaden the scope of tax changes that can be analyzed. Indeed, the United
States offers very rich variation at the state levels. Most existing data samples are too small
to analyze convincingly local changes. The availability of population files for research use
could spur new work on responses to tax changes. However, data for the full population of
filers still require substanital “data cleaning” before these files will include the same breadth
of information that is included in the samples.
B.2 Tax Return Data used in Section 3
The panel of individual tax returns used in Section 3 are from the Statistics of Income (SOI)
and spans years 1991 to 1997. Marginal tax rates are imputed using CBO’s federal tax model.
Income, denoted zit, is a constant-law measure of AGI (adjusted gross income for individual
i at time t), excluding capital gains and including all Social Security benefits, such that zit
= reportedAGI - realizedCG + nontaxableSSbenefits + deductedmovingexpenses. Dollar
values are adjusted by the IRS’s inflation adjustment factors, using 1991 as the base. Marginal
tax rates are imputed for only the federal income tax using the Congressional Budget Office’s
internal tax calculators. The rate imputations exclude changes to the payroll tax (which only
applies to earned income) and to changes in state tax rates. While this leaves an incomplete
measure of the marginal tax rate, it has the virtue of simplicity.
Note that selection into the SOI is conditional on several factors, including income. More
specifically, each individual is assigned a number at random, which does not change from year
to year. For each year, tax returns are separated into strata based on AGI and the forms
and schedules used by the filers. Sampling probabilities vary by strata and reach 100 percent
114The SOI files can be merged within SOI to individual wage income information in order to obtain the
breakdown of income by spouse.
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for very high-income filers. The returns in each stratum are sorted by the randomly assigned
values and the strata sampling probability is used to determine the cut point for inclusion
into the SOI. Because the individual maintains the same random value over time and because
the stratum sampling probability simply determines the cut point for inclusion in the sample,
once included in the SOI, an individual is automatically included in future years if his income
remains the same or if his income increases because this would either put him in the same
stratum or in a stratum with a higher sampling probability — thus maintaining or lowering the
cut point for inclusion. Therefore, an individual observed in the base year is much more likely
to be observed in the future year if his income rises than if it falls. In fact, the probability
that one is observed in two different years is simply the minimum of the strata sampling
probabilities for the two years. This raises the potential for spurious correlation between the
dependent variable (ln( incometincomet+1 )) and the independent variables, including the tax variable.
To avoid this possibility, (paired) observations from the full SOI are weighted by the reciprocal
of their probability of appearing in the sample. This same strategy is employed by a number
of researchers using these data.
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FIGURE 1
Top Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2006
Source: Updated version of Figure 8 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
Income excludes realized capital gains, as well as Social Security and unemployment insurance benefits.
The figure displays the income share (right y-axis) and the average marginal tax rate (left y-axis)
(weigthed by income) for the top 1% (Panel A) and for the next 9% (Panel B) income earners.
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FIGURE 2.
The Top 0.01% US Income Share, Composition, and Marginal Tax Rate, 1960-2006
Source: Updated version of Figure 8 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
The figure displays the income share of the top .01% tax units, and how the top .01% incomes are  
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), 
S-corporation profits, partnership profits, sole proprietorship profits, dividends, interest income, 
and other income. The figure also displays the average marginal tax rate (weigthed by income)
for the top 0.01% in a bold line on the right y-axis.
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Wages S-Corp.
Partnership Sole Prop.
Dividends Interest
Other MTR
Top 1% Next 9%
(1) (2)
A. Tax Reform Episodes
1981 vs. 1984 (ERTA 1981) 0.60 0.21
1986 vs. 1988 (TRA 1986) 1.36 -0.20
1992 vs. 1993 (OBRA 1993) 0.45
1991 vs. 1994 (OBRA 1993) -0.39
B. Full Time Series 1960-2006 
No time trends 1.71 0.01
(0.31) (0.13)
Linear time trend 0.82 -0.02
(0.20) (0.02)
Linear and square time trends 0.74 -0.05
(0.06) (0.03)
Linear, square, and cube time trends 0.58 -0.02
(0.11) (0.02)
Elasticity estimates using top income share time series
Table 1.
Notes: Estimates in panel A are obtained using series from Figure 1 and using the formula
e=[log(income share after reform)-log(income share before reform)]/[log(1- MTR after
reform)-log(1- MTR before reform)]
Estimates in Panel B are obtained by time-series regression of log(top 1% income share)
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate), and polynomials time controls from 1960
to 2006 (44 observations). OLS regression. Standard Errors from Newey-West with 8 lags.
Control group next 9% next 49%
(1) (2)
A. Repeated Cross Sections Analysis
A1. Comparing two years only
1992 and 1993 0.998 0.958
(0.109) (0.107)
1991 and 1994 -0.481 -0.576
(0.115) (0.111)
A2. Using all years 1991 to 1997
1991 to 1997 (no time trends controls) -0.404 -0.570
(0.089) (0.087)
1991 to 1997 (with time trends controls) 1.329 1.342
(0.107) (0.104)
B. Panel Analysis
B1. Comparing two years only
1992 to 1993 changes (no controls) 1.395 1.878
(0.107) (0.184)
1991 to 1994 changes (no controls) 2.420 3.352
(0.221) (0.446)
1992 to 1993 changes (log base year income control) -0.721 0.814
(0.213) (0.149)
1992 to 1993 changes (+splines income controls) -1.669 -1.866
(1.052) (0.711)
B2. Using all 1991-1992,…,1996-1997 changes
No income controls 1.395 1.878
(0.296) (0.338)
Base year log income control 0.537 0.955
(0.264) (0.247)
Base year log income + splines controls 0.564 0.723
(0.259) (0.260)
Base year log income + splines controls 0.143 0.237
(using predicted MTR change instrument) (0.200) (0.077)
Notes: Estimates based on a panel of tax returns (see appendix and Giertz, 2008).
In column (1), the estimates are run using the top 10% tax filers (so that the treatment group is the top 1%
and the control group is the top 10% excluding the top 1%, "The next 9%"). In column (2), the estimates are
run using the top 50% tax filers (so that the control group is the top 50% excluding the top 1%, "The next
49%").
Elasticity estimates using the 1993 top rate increase among top 1% incomes
Table 2.
Panel A estimates are obtained from 2SLS regression: log(zit)=e*log(1-τit)+α∗1(top 1%)+ β∗1(post reform)+εit 
using 1(top 1%)*1(post reform year) as instrument. Time controls in the last row of Panel A2 are group
specific: γ1*t*1(top 1%) + γ2*t*1(not top 1%)
Panel B1 estimates are obtained from 2SLS panel regression: ∆log(zit)=e*∆log(1-τit)+εit using 1(top 1% in
base year) as instrument. Base year income controls log(zit) and 10 splines in zit are added in last two rows.
In Panel B2, comparisons 1991 to 1992, ..., 1996 to 1997 are stacked and year dummies are included in the
2SLS regression. The instrument is 1(top 1% in base year)*1(t=1992). Instrument MTR predicted change
log[(1-τpit)/ (1-τit)] is used in the 4th row of estimates where τpit is the marginal tax rate in year t+1 using
(inflation adjusted) year t income.
Ordinary Income Earned Income Capital Gains Corporate Income
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1952-1963 91.0 91.0 25.0 52
1964 77.0 77.0 25.0 50
1965-1967 70.0 70.0 25.0 48
1968 75.3 75.3 26.9 53
1969 77.0 77.0 27.9 53
1970 71.8 71.8 32.3 49
1971 70.0 60.0 34.3 48
1972-1975 70.0 50.0 36.5 48
1976-1978 70.0 50.0 39.9 48
1979-1980 70.0 50.0 28.0 46
1981 68.8 50.0 23.7 46
1982-1986 50.0 50.0 20.0 46
1987 38.5 38.5 28.0 40
1988-1990 28.0 28.0 28.0 34
1991-1992 31.0 31.0 28.0 34
1993 39.6 39.6 28.0 35
1994-1996 39.6 42.5 28.0 35
1997-2000 39.6 42.5 20.0 35
2001 39.1 42.0 20.0 35
2002 38.6 41.5 20.0 35
2003-2009 35.0 37.9 15.0 35
Table A1.
Top Federal Marginal Tax Rates
Notes: MTRs apply to top incomes. In some instances, lower income taxpayers may face higher MTRs because of income
caps on payroll taxes or the so-called 33 percent "bubble" bracket following TRA 86. From 1952 to 1962, a 87% maximum
average tax rate provision made the top marginal tax rate 87% instead of 91% for many very top income earners. From 1968
to 1970, rates include surtaxes. For earned income, MTRs include the Health Insurance portion of the payroll tax beginning
with year 1994. Rates exclude the effect of phaseouts, which effectively raise top MTRs for many high-income filers. MTRs on
realized "long-term" capital gains are adjusted to reflect that, for some years, a fraction of realized gains were excluded from
taxation. Since 2003, dividends are also tax favored with a maximum tax rate of 15%.
